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INTRODUCTION
The intellectual property landscape is changing. As Jerry Reichman
once observed, intellectual property rights were islands in a sea of the public domain until domestic laws expanded to include such “innovations” as
business methods, software, scents, and sounds and turned the public domain into a pond surrounded by a continent of rights. Reichman spoke
towards the end of the 20th century, and whatever problems accompanied
this change, in truth (to paraphrase Voltaire’s view of the Holy Roman
Empire), the concept of “intellectual property rights” was predominantly
*
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about neither “property” nor “rights” (nor was it always “intellectual”).1
Rather, copyright, patent, and trademark were principally thought of as
incentives to promote innovation and creativity. Debates in the literature,
in policy circles, and in courts were primarily quantitative, concerned with
how much exclusivity was needed to produce adequate encouragement
and how to balance the interest in protection against the access needs of
the public, especially the next generation of innovators.2 Thus, while the
subject matter of protection may have been expanding, there were many
ways in which governments retained significant flexibilities to contour the
“continent” to benefit the public. Not only was protection time-bound, domestic laws recognized various limitations and exceptions that permitted
innovators to build on prior knowledge.3 Countries also had ample freedom to address problems presented by new technologies. And because
monitoring compliance and enforcement were expensive, difficult, and
slow, protection was easily eroded.
Early multilateral international intellectual property agreements preserved the porous nature of intellectual property (IP). The World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) Berne and Paris Conventions
required countries to extend domestic protection to foreigners, but they
imposed minimum levels of protection (at least for copyright and trademark law) and largely left to domestic law exceptions that dealt with public access concerns.4 Ostensibly, the shift in lawmaking from WIPO to the
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) merely expanded on this approach.
The 1995 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS Agreement) adopted minimum standards for patent protection,
raised the levels of protection for copyright and trademark, extended coverage to trade secrets, design protection, and geographical indications, and
instituted enforcement obligations.5 But still, the debate, both domestic
1.
On the nature of intellectual property, see Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter
Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1992-1993); Jeremy
Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841 (1992-1993).
2.
See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors.”). See generally William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).
3.
For example, countries have laws permitting experimentation with patented inventions that could lead to non-infringing workarounds and superseding inventions. They permit
fair use to facilitated socially-productive utilization of copyrighted works and trademarks.
The first sale doctrine releases used copyrighted, trademarked, and patented works into the
public’s hands. Trade secrets can be reverse-engineered.
4.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971,
1161 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
5.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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and international, focused on how much protection was needed to encourage new production and (to a lesser extent) whether the right balance
between public and private interests was being struck.
The loss of WIPO’s hegemony over IP through the adoption of TRIPS
was, however, soon followed by other efforts at international lawmaking in
the IP realm. These included the use of free trade agreements (FTAs),
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and regional pacts, which were all
aimed at further enhancing the level of protection. But as Larry Helfer
chronicled in his 2004 article on regime shifting, 6 there were also attempts
to influence the international IP regime so as to better safeguard public
interests in health, human rights, genetic diversity, nutrition, and development.7 Those events, and Helfer’s path-breaking piece, changed the conversation. While Helfer argued that regulatory competition among
international institutions was beneficial, the literature began to consider
the detrimental effects of law production in multiple venues: the drain on
resources, particularly of the less powerful; the onset of fragmentation;
and the cycling of disputes among national and international tribunals.8
Clearly, boundary expansion, fragmentation, and cycling are important and deserve sustained attention.9 We, however, see in regime shifting
an unanticipated—and largely overlooked—consequence: the development has entrenched a new qualitative vision of IP, one that drives a fundamental reconceptualization. Thus, a comparison of the WTO’s TRIPS
Agreement with the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
[GATT] moved from framing IP as a barrier to trade10 into conceptualizing it as a tradable commodity in the name of facilitating trade. It put
enforcement on the international agenda and emphasized the rhetoric of
“rights.” The shift from TRIPS to FTAs and BITs was equally drastic: it
converted IP into an investment asset subject to claims of direct and indirect expropriation, thereby emphasizing the rhetoric of “property.”
6.
Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004).
7.
See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143
[hereinafter CBD].
8.
See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (2012); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS,
ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 451 (2011); Susy Frankel, The Legitimacy and
Purpose of Intellectual Property Chapters in FTAs, in CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL
TRADE THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS (Ross
Buckley, Vai Io Lo & Laurence Boulle eds., 2008) at 185; Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPS:
Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP’Y 791 (2001).
9.
See, e.g., Ruti Teitel and Robert Howse, Cross-Judging Tribunalization in the Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 959, 962-8 (20082009).
10.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX (d), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (exempting measures “necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including . . . the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention
of deceptive practices” from the scope of the GATT).
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The effect of these changes cannot be underestimated. Where
Reichman described continents emerging from a sea of the public domain
and Helfer emphasized continental drift, these developments suggest that
the new topography is unyieldingly rigid. These trade and investment rationales are largely impervious to flexibility and balancing. They protect
those holding property—incumbents—even if it is at the cost of undermining public-regarding measures and discouraging new entrants and innovation. It is no wonder then that negotiations over the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP) were hard fought on account of concerns
over its IP provisions or that Canada, which is currently subject to an investor dispute under NAFTA over patent rights, is balking at the application of the investment chapters of the proposed Comprehensive Trade and
Investment Agreement (CETA) to IP.11
In this paper, we examine the effects of the shift from quantitative to a
qualitative solidification of the IP landscape. In the first two sections, we
choose examples from these rather extensive agreements to demonstrate
how the evolution of international lawmaking, which may well have
started as a purposive response by post-industrial economies, 12 is all too
rapidly eclipsing incentive rationales for intellectual property protection.
Using recent controversies over the working requirement and tobacco
packaging, we next look at how commodification and assetization alter the
debate over protecting creative output and to the loss of flexibility and
diminished public access. While our major contribution lies in making the
cumulative effect of these successive changes salient, we end by suggesting
ways that governance at the international level could be improved to avoid
the negative impact of reconceptualization.
I.

FROM INCENTIVES

TO

COMMODIFICATION

While there are many theories for IP protection, the dominant justification has long been incentive-based: in order to encourage innovation,
those investing in creative production must be protected against free riders
11.
The TPP was concluded in October 2015, but it has not been ratified. Furthermore,
as of this writing, only a leaked text of the intellectual property chapter is available, see TPP
Treaty: Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, Consolidated Text (October 5, 2015), art.
QQ.A.11 WIKILEAKS (Oct. 9, 2015), https://wikileaks.org/tpp-ip3/ [hereinafter TPP 2015].
See, e.g., EU, Canada Fail To Close CETA; Stuck Over Issue Related to Eli Lilly Case, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, (September 12, 2013). See generally, Notice of Arbitration, Eli Lilly (September
12, 2013), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topicsdomaines/disp-diff/eli.aspx?lang=eng. Also, the “Australian Government is opposed to signing up to international agreements that would restrict Australia’s capacity to govern in the
public interest—including in areas such as public health, the environment or any other area
of the economy.” See Frequently Asked Questions on Investor-State Dispute Settlement, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, https://www.dfat
.gov.au/fta/isds-faq.html (last visited July 8, 2015).
12.
See, e.g., U.S. Commerce Department Releases New Report Showing Intellectual
Property-Intensive Industries Contribute $5 Trillion, 40 Million Jobs to US Economy, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (Apr. 2012), http://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2012/04/11/us-commerce-department-releases-new-report-showing-intellectual-prope.
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who would otherwise compete down prices, prevent the recoupment of
costs, and diminish the opportunity to collect profits sufficient to compensate for taking risk.13 Incentive theorists recognize, however, that the drive
to ensure adequate incentives must be tempered by other concerns.
Knowledge is cumulative and consumers demand interoperable products
and backward compatibility; progress cannot occur unless the next generation can build on earlier innovations. As important, intellectual products
have strong cultural, competitive, and educational dimensions as well as
health, safety, and environmental implications. How far the interest in
protection must give way to these other interests has been highly contested as has been the best approach to safeguarding public access
imperatives.14
The Paris and Berne Conventions largely followed the quantitative,
incentive-based, approach. As Thomas Dreier has described in his writing
on the Berne Convention, when these agreements were adopted at the end
of the 19th century, the main international concern was seepage of copyrighted goods from a place where they were not protected into a place
where they were.15 The proximity of states using the same language meant
that each could undermine the individual balances set by the others by
permitting unauthorized production of foreign works, which could then be
sold back into the region of the foreign creator. Publishers of copyrighted
works obliged to pay royalties, for example in France, could not compete
with unauthorized Belgian copies spilling back over the French border. To
solve the problem, the conventions created a set of minimum protections
that each country had to extend to all creators operating in member countries.16 In addition, because it was recognized that reputation and information can precede market entry, the Paris Convention required members to
prevent third parties from adopting a mark that was well known in their
territories, even if the mark was not used there, and to consider earlier
foreign filings when determining priority dates for patents and trademarks.17 Berne reached the same result by banning formalities as a condition of copyright protection.18 In most other respects, however, both
agreements left matters to domestic law. Thus, apart from a few restrictions, such as the three-step framework for exceptions to the reproduction
13.
14.

See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 2.
For a sampling of the literature, see WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Rochelle Dreyfuss, Diane L. Zimmerman & Harry First eds., 2010);
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005);
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman & Harry
First eds., 2001) [hereinafter EXPANDING BOUNDARIES].
15.
Thomas Dreier, Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or
Outside of Proprietary Rights, in EXPANDING BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 295, 300.
16.
Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 3; Paris Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
17.
Paris Convention, supra note 4, arts. 6bis (well-known marks) and 4 (priority
date).
18.
Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(2).
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right introduced into the Berne Convention in 1967,19 each member remained free to craft the limitations and exceptions it considered necessary
to safeguard the interests of its population. Since neither agreement included a strong compliance mechanism, domestic solutions to balancing
problems were never challenged in an international forum.20
After World War II, IP began to matter in a new way. The international regime promoted economic prosperity and peace through trade—
hence, the GATT Agreement21 and the development of the European
Common Market.22 Technological changes significantly facilitated the
way. Containerization reduced transportation costs for hard goods;23 forty
years later, the internet eliminated distribution costs for works that could
be digitized. With expanded market opportunities and increased appreciation for foreign creative products came the potential for greater incentives
to innovate. The liberalization of trade also led to the relocation of manufacturing and the development of global value chains that geographically
separate research, development, production, distribution, and servicing.24
As IP grew in economic significance, it became more prominent in
political debate. Spill backs were no longer the sole cause for concern.
Suddenly, innovators cared about the precise level of protection everywhere, for that affected their incentives as well as their ability to use IP as
markers for allocating profits among value chain members.25 When WIPO
proved unable to update the Berne and Paris Convention to accommodate
globalization, attention shifted to the WTO; the TRIPS Agreement was
the outcome.26 Once IP became a global trade issue, however, the door
opened to a different type of discourse about the nature of protection. The
emphasis of international accord focused on commodification and main19.
Id. art. 9(2).
20.
In theory, a member that failed to comply with its obligations under Paris or Berne
could be sued in the International Court of Justice. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art.
33; Paris Convention, supra note 4, art. 28. However, no such cases have ever been brought.
21.
See, e.g., The WTO can contribute to peace and stability, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10thi_e/10thi09_e.htm; DEBRA P.
STEGER, PEACE THROUGH TRADE: BUILDING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 15
(2004).
22.
See, e.g., MARTIN J. DEDMAN, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1945-2008: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 90 (2d ed. 2009).
23.
See, e.g., David Hummels, Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of Globalization, 21 J. EC. PERSP. 131, 141, 152 (2007).
24.
See, e.g., Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey & Timothy Sturgeon, The Governance of
Global Value Chains, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 78, 78-79 (2005); see also SUSY FRANKEL,
TEST TUBES FOR GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES: SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES
(2015).
25.
That is, patents and trade secrets pinpoint who in the chain made specific inventive
contributions; trademarks and geographical indications identify the source of each component; copyrights signify other creative inputs. See, e.g., Gereffi, supra note 24, at 95; Warren
Maruyama, The WTO: Domestic Regulation and the Challenge of Shaping Trade, 37 INT’L
LAW. 677 (2003).
26.
See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The Future of the Multilateral Trading System in the
Context of TRIPS, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 661, 664-65 (1997).
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taining comparative advantage.27 The result transforms IP protection into
more than primarily an innovation incentive and into a right proper.28
First, national commitments became the subject to a regimented rulesbased system, enforced by the WTO’s Understanding of Dispute Settlement (DSU), a quasi-legal compliance mechanism that permits member
states to challenge one another’s adherence to the Agreement before the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).29 For the first time, failure to meet international IP obligations could lead to sanctions, including retaliation or, in
cases where the law could not be changed quickly, the responsibility to pay
compensation for ongoing violations.30
Second, state power to establish an innovative sector was constrained.
Berne and Paris preserved avenues for countries that wished to encourage
the creative development of their citizens. An appendix to Berne permitted states to have books translated into local languages; 31 the Paris Convention allowed countries to require the patent holder to work the
invention in their territories, thereby giving jobs and training opportunities
to locals. But the theory of comparative advantage suggests that in sectors
where a country is not at the technological frontier, it should import innovative products rather than create space for their own populace to become
innovative. Thus, with comparative advantage comes a new emphasis on
nondiscrimination. Where Berne and Paris operated on a principle of national treatment, TRIPS adds a most-favored nation obligation. Further, in
its patent provisions, TRIPS prohibits discrimination by field of technology, place of invention, and whether products are imported or locally
produced.32
Third, internationally mandated rules on limitations and exceptions
curbed the flexibilities available to WTO members to protect public interests. Some of these new measures are highly specific. Examples include a
provision permitting members to exclude plants from patent obligations,
but only so long as they adopt another protective scheme; 33 compulsory
licensing of patented inventions is allowed, but countries must abide by
27.
For an explanation of comparative advantage in today’s trade law, see MICHAEL
TREBILCOCK, ROBERT HOWSE & ANTONIA ELIASON, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 3-6 (4th Ed. 2013).
28.
See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUSTON L.
REV. 1047 (2009).
29.
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
30.
See id. arts. 3.7, 22.
31.
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Stockholm Revision, July 14, 1967, U.N.T.S. No. I-11850, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (January 1, 1970 being
the effective date for the administrative provisions; the substantive provisions were incorporated into the later Paris Revision). The provision has, however, proved to be ineffective. See
R. L. Okediji, Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works in Developing
Countries, in Maskus & Reichman, supra note 14.
32.
See TRIPS Agreement art. 27.1.
33.
See id. art. 27.3(b).
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over ten detailed restrictions on granting them.34 For each major IP right,
there is also an exception that is nominally open-ended. However, all the
measures are based on Berne’s three-step exceptions test—a test that was
specifically developed to protect the reproduction right, arguably the most
important stick in the copyright bundle. In carrying that test forward,
TRIPS limits every type of copyright exception to the same vigorous extent and offers only slightly more flexibility regarding trademark, design,
and patent limitations.35 In all cases, the emphasis is on the economic—or
trade related—aspects of IP, and the focus is mainly on the degree to
which the exception is circumscribed and the effect on normal exploitation
and the legitimate interests of the IP owner. In addition, the Berne provision referred to “authors”; the TRIPS exceptions focus on “rights-holders”
and “owners.” The provisions came under early scrutiny in two WTO disputes, Canada-Pharmaceuticals (on patents) and US-110(5) (on copyright).36 In neither case did the panel find much room to consider public
interests.37 To make matters even more difficult, the Canada-Pharmaceuticals panel also decided that exceptions must be nondiscriminatory; thus,
they must be limited but also drawn broadly enough to include any field
that may present similar problems.
Fourth, the rights talk in TRIPS goes hand in hand with a focus on
domestic enforcement. Neither Berne nor Paris required states to adopt
enforcement procedures. In contrast, the TRIPS Agreement requires
WTO members to provide expeditious measures that constitute a deterrent to infringement.38 Every state must give judges authority to issue injunctions, award monetary relief, seize infringing goods and the machinery
of infringement, and take infringing goods out of the right-holder’s market.39 WTO members must also give courts the authority to issue provisional measures and customs authorities the power to exclude counterfeit
or pirated goods (infringements which are particularly easy to spot) at the
border before they enter the market.40 Criminal penalties must be pro34.

See id. art. 31.

35.

See id. arts. 13, 17, 26.2, 30.

36.
See Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/
DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-Pharmaceuticals]; see also Panel Report,
United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter US-110(5)].
37.
See Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 36; see also US-110(5), supra note 36.
Thus the tests consider whether an exception is limited or, in the case of copyright, “special.”
These might have provided an opportunity for weighing, but neither panel used the opening.
Both panels also applied the three steps in the exceptions tests cumulatively. Since the rights
of third parties only come up in the third part of test, the panels managed to avoid considering them as well. The panels also refused to take account of the underlying policy that led the
state to enact the measure or the TRIPS Agreement’s stated objective to balance rights and
obligations and further social and economic welfare.
38.

See Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 36.

39.

See TRIPS Agreement arts. 44-46.

40.

See id. arts. 50-51.
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vided for “willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.”41
In its move to commodification, TRIPS does not, however, squeeze
out all space for nations to use exceptions to address local needs. Its Basic
Principles state that members are free to determine the appropriate methods for implementing their obligations in their own legal systems.42 The
Agreement does not allow for WTO disputes over whether rights are exhausted nationally or internationally thus permitting countries to parallel
import works that were sold in foreign countries under the authority of the
right holder.43 Moreover, TRIPS, as later underscored by a WTO Ministerial Declaration (the Doha Declaration), specifically recognizes domestic
authority to balance rights and obligations, to promote social and economic welfare, and to adopt measures to protect public health and
nutrition.44
Significantly, key terms in the Agreement are not defined. For example, while the Agreement requires countries to protect inventions in all
fields of technology if they involve “an inventive step,”45 it equates “inventive step” to “non-obvious”46 but does not otherwise define the terms.
This has, for example, allowed countries such as India to refrain, either on
a theory of no invention or non-inventiveness, from protecting a new use
of a known product and to bar patents on new forms of known substances
if efficacy is not enhanced.47 Finally, the Agreement emphasizes that no
country must put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of IP rights
that is distinct from the enforcement of law in general.48
DSB reports have also evolved. Although, as noted in early dispute
resolutions, the panels took a rather rigid approach to TRIPS, later panels
saw more flexibility. Thus the Canada-Pharmaceuticals and US-110(5) reports were followed by the EC-GI dispute.49 In that case, the panel took a
more permissive approach to exceptions to trademark rights. Moreover, a
dispute challenging enforcement procedures in China recognized that
countries can, consistent with TRIPS, take a variety of approaches to remedies. Consequently, the China-Enforcement panel was highly deferential

41.

Id. art. 61.

42.

See id. art. 1.1.

43.

See id. art. 6.

44.
Id., arts. 7-8; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, ¶¶ 17, 19, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1.
45.

TRIPS Agreement art. 27.1

46.

Id. at n.5.

47.

The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, § 3(d) (Universal 2005) (India).

48.

TRIPS Agreement art. 41.5

49.
Panel Report, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter EC-GI].
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to China’s policy choices.50 The panel did not require China to stop infringing goods from leaving the country. It interpreted the provisions stating that judicial “authorities must have the authority” to issue relief, as
merely requiring that courts possess the power to order relief, and not as
requiring them to exercise it. Under TRIPS, criminal penalties are triggered only by counterfeiting and piracy “on a commercial scale”;51 the
panel read that to mean infringement must be on a large scale and for
commercial gain.
II.

FROM COMMODIFICATION

TO

ASSETIZATION

But even this flexibility may not last. Much of the later regime shifting
is aimed at correcting perceived inadequacies in TRIPS. Thus there are
multilateral soft and hard laws, as well as bilateral, plurilateral, and regional agreements that define terms, fill gaps, further constrain flexibilities, and prescribe particularized enforcement regimes. More importantly,
these measures effectuate linkage between IP and investment regimes.
While TRIPS laid the platform for commodification, much of the current regime shifting is reconceptualizing IP as an asset and progressively
detaching it from its grounding in incentive-based principles. Remedying
perceived inadequacies solidifies the rights side of the equation. The remaining flexibility in the three-step test is under considerable pressure, as
variants have found their way into three post-TRIPS Agreements, the
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), and the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to
Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled (Treaty for the Visually Impaired).52 Morphed yet
again, the three-step test has also been incorporated into national laws,53

50.
Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter ChinaEnforcement].
51.
TRIPS Agreement art. 61.
52.
WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 10.11, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17;
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 16.2, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No.
105-17 (1997), 2186 U.N.T.S. 245; Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works
for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, art. 11, June 27,
2013, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=13169 [hereinafter Treaty for the Visually
Impaired].
53.
WIPO, Limitations and Exceptions Under The “Three-Step Test” and In National
Legislation – Differences Between The Analog And Digital Environments, WIPO/DA/MVD/
00/4 (August 29, 2000). See, e.g., Civil Code of the Republic of Armenia art. 1127 (Arm.);
Copyright Act 1968, s200AB (Australia); Law on the Promotion and Protection of Intellectual Property, art. 49-C (El Sal.), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/; The Copyright Protection
Law of 1992, art. 17(b) (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/.
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into FTAs,54 and the TPP.55 Placed in new contexts and subject to dispute
resolution in new fora, its interpretation remains to be determined.56
Because the essentially toothless standard of enforcement adopted in
the China-Enforcement report is not functionally adequate for a rightsbased approach to IP, proponents of rights-focused IP have campaigned
domestically for enhanced enforcement mechanisms. For example, the
United States has applied its law extraterritorially to infringing activities
occurring abroad and has tried (but so far failed) to strictly police the internet.57 Australia has enacted extensive statutory criminal provisions.58
And until the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) limited the
procedure, the European Union (EU) was stopping goods in transit on a
theory of local infringement, but without regard to whether the goods infringed in their country of origin or at their destination.59 At the international level, similar efforts produced the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA), IP provisions in various bilateral and regional FTAs,
and the TPP as well as negotiations over CETA.
ACTA, a 2011 agreement among Australia, Canada, the European
Union, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United States60 repeats many of the obligations found in
TRIPS but adds definitions that, if found in TRIPS, would change the result in China-Enforcement. Where TRIPS did not specify how to calculate
damages for copyright infringement, thus permitting China to measure
compensation by local losses (that is, the price that would clear local demand), ACTA requires the court to consider “any legitimate measure of
value the right holder submits, which may include lost profits, the value of
54.
See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the
Republic Of Korea, U.S.-S. Kor., arts. 18.4 (1), n. 11; 18.4 (10)(a); 18.8 (3), June 30, 2007–Feb.
21, 2012, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text [hereinafter KORUS].
55.
See, e.g., TPP 2015, supra note 11, arts. QQ.C.4 (trademarks); QQ.E.4 (patents);
QQ.G.16(a)(copyrights).
56.
For suggestions for how to interpret the test, see Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais & Martin Senftleben, The Three-Step Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in
National Copyright Law, 29(3) AM. U. INT’L L. REV., 581, 597-607 (2014) (suggesting that in
other contexts, decision makers could take better account of the diverse social, economic,
and cultural policies of the signatories, think more holistically, or apply the steps in reverse
order).
57.
See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); L.A. News Serv. v.
Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998); Stop Online Piracy Act
(“SOPA”), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Protect Intellectual Property Act, S. 1830, 112th
Cong. (2011).
58.

Copyright Act 1968, pt 5, div 5 (Austl).

59.
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Lucheng Meijing Industrial Company Ltd,
Far East Sourcing Ltd, Röhlig Hong Kong Ltd and Röhlig Belgium NV and Nokia Corporation v. Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Revenue and Customs, 1 December 2011, Joined
Cases C?446/09 and C?495/09.
60.
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, opened for signature May 1,
2011, 50 I.L.M. 243 (2011), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/december/tradoc_1470
79.pdf [hereinafter ACTA].
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the infringed goods or services measured by the market price, or the suggested retail price.”61 Where the panel permitted China to return counterfeit trademarked goods to the market, ACTA requires destruction, except
in “exceptional circumstances.”62 The DSB defined “on a commercial
scale” (the trigger for criminal penalties) to require commercial benefit on
a large scale; ACTA specifies that commercial scale includes “commercial
activities for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage.”63 In
addition, ACTA is framed so that other countries take a role in preventing
widespread dissemination of infringing works. It permits members to
adopt measures to stop pirated copyrighted goods and counterfeit trademarked goods in transit.64
ACTA has not yet gone into force and probably never will.65 So far,
only one country (Japan) has ratified it.66 In spite of this impediment, limited domestic success, and the outcome in the China-Enforcement dispute,
the drive for greater enforcement continues and has multiple outlets.
These efforts intend not only to “fix” the enforcement problem but move
well beyond it.
Consider some of the prescriptive details in the FTAs that the United
States has entered into over the last few decades. 67 The agreement with
Korea (KORUS), which came into force in 2011, is a good example.68
KORUS adopts the enforcement obligations laid out in ACTA, with some
significant variations. “On a commercial scale” now includes the “the receipt or expectation of anything of value.” 69 There is an expansion of the
rule on in-transit seizure: countries “shall” adopt procedures to stop intransit goods that are suspected of being pirated or counterfeit as well as
goods that are suspected of being confusingly similar to trademark
goods.70 KORUS also elaborates on TRIPS substantively. For example,
61.
Id. art. 9(1). ACTA also requires a party to maintain a system for pre-established
damages or presumptions for determining compensatory damages, and for copyright, additional damages. See id. art. 9(3).
62.

Id. art. 10(1).

63.

Id. art. 23(1).

64.

Id. art. 16(2).

65.
For the mechanics of its defeat, see James Losey, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement and European Civil Society: A Case Study on Networked Advocacy, J. INFO POL’Y
4 (2014) 205-27, http://jip.vmhost.psu.edu/ojs/index.php/jip/article/view/168/119.
66.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2014), at 14, https://
ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR%202014%20Special%20301%20Report%20to%20Cong
ress%20FINAL.pdf.
67.
For a discussion of how the European Union is pursuing similar objectives in its
European Partnership Agreements, see Henning Grosse Ruse–Khan, Protecting Intellectual
Property Under BITS, FTAS, and TRIPS: Conflicting Regimes or Mutual Coherence?, in
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 485, 493-494 (K. Miles, C.
Brown, eds., Cambridge University Press 2011).
68.

KORUS, supra note 54.

69.

Id. arts. 18.10.26, 18.10.26 n.33.

70.

Id. art. 18.10.22.
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plants can no longer be excluded from patentability.71 There is an obligation to patent new uses of known products (thus barring Korea or the
United States from adopting the Indian approach to pharmaceuticals).72
Furthermore, KORUS adds new obligations. It requires accession or reasonable efforts to ratify eleven instruments not mentioned in TRIPS.73
Whereas TRIPS has no rules about price controls, KORUS requires countries to publish in advance proposed prices for pharmaceuticals and to give
“interested persons” a reasonable opportunity to comment.74
Other agreements add more obligations. AUSFTA, the 2005 FTA between the United States and Australia, provides trademark protection for
sounds and scents (TRIPS requires protection only for visually perceptible
marks).75 It limits the grounds on which either country can award compulsory patent licenses76 and narrows their ability to parallel import patented
products.77
The TPP, an agreement among Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the
United States, and Vietnam, threatened to go even further, and in some
cases, succeeded. Leaked negotiation text show that the United States had
proposed that parties allow copyright owners to prevent the importation
of even authorized copies of works thus, prohibiting parallel imports.78
Although this proposal appears to have been rejected,79 for trademarks,
the TPP apparently will bar the use of visual perceptibility as a condition
of trademark registration80 and require adherence to the Joint Recommendation on Well Known Marks, a soft law agreement adopted in 1999
by the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Prop71.

Id. art. 18.8.2.

72.

Id. art. 18.8.1.

73.

Id. arts. 18.8.3, 18.8.4.

74.
Id. arts. 5.3.1, 5.3.2. In a Confirmation Letter, Korea also agreed to ensure that the
body setting prices be independent of the health authorities.
75.
The Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.2.2, May
18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248, [hereinafter AUSFTA]; TRIPS Agreement art. 15.1.
76.

AUSFTA, supra note 75, art. 17.9.7.

77.
Id., at 17.9.4. See also The United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.Morocco, art. 15.9.4, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 (2005), [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA];
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on
the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, art. 4.11, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63
[hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA].
78.
Secret TPP Treaty: Advanced Intellectual Property Chapter for All 12 Nations with
Negotiating Positions, WIKILEAKS (Nov. 13, 2013), https://wikileaks.org/tpp/static/pdf/Wiki
leaks-secret-TPP-treaty-IP-chapter.pdf [hereinafter TPP 2013] (“Negotiator’s Note: The US
is considering the relationship between this provision and other proposals regarding the exhaustion of IP rights, as well as other TPP countries’ legal regimes.”). Other countries have
proposed encouraging international exhaustion. Id. art. QQ.G.17.
79.

TPP 2015, supra note 11, art. QQ.A.11.

80.

Id., art. QQ.C.1.
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erty and the General Assembly of WIPO,81 which expanded protection for
well-known marks and extended the scope of protection beyond consumer
confusion to dilution.82 For patents, the TPP proposed to remove the specific exceptions for diagnostic, surgical, and therapeutic treatment of
humans or animals 83 and it apparently will prevent countries from denying patents on the sole ground that efficacy is not enhanced.84 The threestep exceptions framework test is repeated. However, during the negotiations, some of the participants were so concerned that the intent of the
TPP was to tighten the test, through its own dispute resolution mechanisms, that they proposed specific exceptions to cover important issues,
such as the ability of generic drug companies to conduct experiments during the patent period, experimentation, and the ability of countries to issue
compulsory licenses.85
In isolation, many of these developments are incremental changes.
However, the net effect is a difference not merely in degree, but in kind.
In total, the changes create new norms regarding the appropriate level of
protection and excludability and an unraveling of the incentive-based rationale for protection. Together, the new agreements re-conceptualize the
nature of IP. As Margreth Barrett aptly put it: “Where investment goes,
an inherent sense of property right tends to follow.”86 The changes to
trademark law—the extension in geographic scope, the expansion to dilution, the responsibility to seize goods in transit—provide a powerful illus81.
See Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of WellKnown Marks [hereinafter Joint Recommendation], WIPO and Assembly of the Paris Union
for the Protection of Industrial Property, Sept. 29, 1999, 883(E), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
pubdocs/en/marks/833/pub833.pdf.
82.
TPP 2015, supra note 11, art.QQ.C.5; Joint Recommendation, supra note 81, arts.
2(2)(iii), art. 4 (1) (iii) (requiring protection of the use is likely to impair or dilute in an unfair
manner the distinctive character of the mark). Provisions of the Joint Recommendation are
also included in existing FTAs. See, e.g., U.S.-Jordan FTA.
83.
TPP 2013, supra note 78, art. QQ.E.1: {Patents / Patentable Subject matter}, n.136
(“Negotiator’s Note: The US is considering the relationship between this provision and other
proposals regarding the exhaustion of IP rights, as well as other TPP countries’ legal regimes”); see also James Love, Copyright Limitations and Exceptions: What Does the Secret
TPPA Text Say?, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL (July 3, 2012, 3:21 PM), http://
keionline.org/node/1451. This provision was apparently eliminated, TPP 2015, supra note 11,
art. QQ.E.3.
84.

Id. art. QQ.E.2.

85.
TPP 2013, supra note 78, art. QQ.E.5: {Exceptions}, art. QQ.E.5bis: {Regulatory
Review Exception}, art. QQ.E.5ter: {Experimental Use of a Patent}, art. QQ.E.5quater:
{Other Use Without Authorisation of the Right Holder}. TPP 2015 does elaborate on
achieving the appropriate balance in copyright, see TPP 2015, supra note 11, at QQ.G.17. A
draft of the Investment Chapter of the TPP has also been leaked and clearly includes investor-state dispute resolution. See Secret TPP Treaty: Advanced Intellectual Property Chapter
for All 12 Nations with Negotiating Positions [Draft], WIKILEAKS (2012), http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/tppinvestment.pdf. The TPP also includes state-tostate dispute settlement, TPP 2015, supra note 11.
86.
Margreth Barrett, A Cause of Action for “Passing Off/Associational Marketing”, 1
IP THEORY 1, 2 (2010), http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1000&context=ipt.
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tration.87 Trademarks become, in the words of Mark Lemley, “strong
unfettered property rights.”88
Significantly, once assetization is realized through successive negotiations over IP, investment treaties and investment chapters in free trade
agreements become significant, for lurking within them are provisions defining IP as assets and a mechanism—investor-state arbitration—that protects these assets from direct or indirect expropriation and guarantees
investors fair and equitable treatment. Early instruments adopt the terminology of, and therefore are interpretively connected to, the Berne and
Paris Conventions.89 But as protection became more pervasive, the language changed. Later BITs refer specifically to TRIPS and speak of “intellectual property rights” or use other broad terms to cover the breadth of
creative production.90
87.
The CJEU stopped in-transit seizure on the theory that trademarks create channels of communications with customers. Without proof that the trademarked goods in question where entering the EU, the court held there could not be consumer confusion and
therefore no power to seize the goods. Provisions such as KORUS and ACTA, that permit
(or require) goods to be stopped in-transit treat the rights as property—the ability to seize is
no longer dependent on communicative effect. Requirements to recognize the Recommendation on Well Known Marks underscore this move. The Paris Convention requires a country
to protect foreign marks that are “well known in that country” and domestic cases interpreting that provision have tended to require a high degree of renown. In contrast, the Recommendation considers marks to be well known when they are known in only business circles.
The Recommendation goes on to reject consumer confusion as the sole test for infringement.
88.
Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1694 (1999). See also Lionel Bently, From Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects of the Conceptualization of Trade Marks as Property, in TRADEMARK LAW AND
THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D.
Janis, eds. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Cheltenham 2008). Bently examines whether property rhetoric is responsible for enhanced protection. We do not make that point. Rather, we
suggest that property rhetoric helps describe what is happening.
A similar story can be told about patents. TRIPS commodified patents by requiring that
every country recognize both product and process patents, delineating the criteria of patentability, and setting out a suite of exclusive rights. The FTAs then defined the terms that were
previously flexible, leading to harmonization and standardization, and ultimately, to assets
amenable to use as investment vehicles, cf. David Bowie, who, in 1997, securitized his song
catalogue for $55 million.
89.
For example, the 1988 BIT between and Switzerland and Uruguay covers “les
droits d’auteur, droits de propriété industrielle (tels que brevets d’invention, modèles
d’utilité, dessins ou modèles industriels, marques de fabrique ou de commerce, marques de
service, noms commerciaux, indications de provenance ou appellations d’origine), savoirfaire et clientele[.]” Accord Entre la Confédération Suisse et la République Orientale de
l’Uruguay Concernant la Promotion et la Protection Réciproques des Investissements, art.
1(2)(d), Switz.-Uru., Oct. 7, 1988, RO 1992 1810.
90.
The 1985 BIT between the United States and Turkey describes “intellectual property, including such as copyrights and related patents, trade marks and trade names, industrial designs,” but goes further, mentioning “trade secrets and know-how[.]” Turkey Bilateral
Investment Treaty, art 1(iv), U.S.- Turk., Dec. 3, 1985, Senate Treaty Doc. 99-19. KORUS
provides that “[covered] investment” means “every asset that an investor owns or controls,
directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment.” It includes intellectual
property rights in a list of the “forms that an investment may take[.]” KORUS, supra note 54,
art 11:28.

572

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 36:557

When IP is recast as an investment asset, its property dimensions
come into even sharper focus. Because traditional IP law is aimed at encouraging creativity, questions of protection center on the innovation, not
the investment: in trademarks, effective communication with consumers;
in patents, inventiveness; in copyright, original expression. As Justice
Brandeis stated in an opinion invalidating the trademark Shredded Wheat,
which the holder claimed deserved protection because $17,000,000 had
been put into creating it, “[t]hose facts are without legal significance.”91
The Justice wanted to know how “Shredded Wheat” was functioning in
the marketplace. As described in investment law, IP is about “the characteristics of an investment [such as] the commitment of capital or other
resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.”92
To put it another way, conventional IP law had benchmarks: to be actionable, infringement must impair the power to identify source (in trademark)
or the incentive to innovate (in patent and copyright). There is, however,
no equivalent IP-related benchmark for determining what constitutes an
expropriation.
Asssetization changes both the procedures of adjudication and the
substantive matters considered. Investment disputes are fundamentally
different from disputes in the WTO. In the WTO, states decide whether to
bring a dispute to the DSB.93 They may decline to pursue a perceived
injury for political or policy reasons. For example, so far, no state has challenged India’s singular definitions of “invention” and “inventiveness”
before the WTO, even though the application of India’s criteria notoriously led to Novartis’s loss of a patent on Gleevac, a valuable treatment
for leukemia.94 Even when a state decides to go forward, the DSU re91.
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119 (1938). He went on to say,
“Kellogg Company’s right was not one dependent upon diligent exercise. Like every other
member of the public, it was, and remained, free to make shredded wheat when it chose to
do so, and to call the product by its generic name. The only obligation resting upon Kellogg
Company was to identify its own product lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff.” Id. See
also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 353, 354
(1991) (“Decisions of this Court applying the 1909 Act make clear that the statute did not
permit the ‘sweat of the brow’ approach . . . . ” “Protection for the fruits of such research . . .
may in certain circumstances be available under a theory of unfair competition (false). . . .”
“But to accord copyright protection on this basis alone distorts basic copyright principles in
that it creates a monopoly in public domain materials without the necessary justification of
protecting and encouraging the creation of ‘writings’ by ‘authors.’ ”) (alteration in original).
92.

See, e.g., KORUS, supra note 54, art. 11.28.

93.
See generally Daniel Kalderimis, Exploring the Differences between WTO and Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution, in TRADE AGREEMENTS AT THE CROSSROADS (Susy
Frankel & Meredith Kolsky Lewis eds, Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group 2014).
94.
See Sidhartha, US Faces Pressure to Take India to WTO, THE TIMES OF INDIA
(New Delhi), May 6, 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/USfaces-pressure-to-take-India-to-WTO/articleshow/34700793.cms; Novartis AG v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 2728 of 2013, ¶¶ 64-67, 195-96 (Sup. Ct. India Apr. 1, 2013), http://
supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf. Similarly, South Africa’s decision to award
compulsory licenses for AIDS medication was initially challenged by pharmaceutical companies in the South Africa Supreme Court, but eventually they backed off and no country
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quires diplomatic consultations before a panel is formed.95 These negotiations often end the dispute, as when the United States backed off from
challenging Argentina’s alleged failure to provide adequate protection to
undisclosed pharmaceutical market-clearance data.96 Moreover, once a
challenge is brought, states retain the power to decide which arguments to
make. A state may, for example, desist from challenging another state’s
use of a flexibility in an agreement that it also wishes to use. In contrast,
investment arbitration is initiated by the investor right holders. Geopolitical considerations and social welfare are not necessarily relevant to their
decisions to demand arbitration, settle disputes, or make particular
assertions.
The issues decided at the WTO and in an investment dispute are also
different. When the DSB is asked to decide whether a national court offered “effective enforcement” and “fair and equitable” procedures in IP
enforcement actions,97 it has benchmarks—effective relief must be provided. But as the China-Enforcement panel determined, a state is not required to offer more to IP holders than it provides for the enforcement of
other laws; while states must give judicial authorities various powers, the
judicial authorities are not required to exercise them.98 Furthermore,
rights to information must be proportionate to the seriousness of the infringement. 99 In investment disputes, the question is whether the state
afforded “due process” and “fair and equitable treatment,” but there is no
IP incentive-related benchmark.100 Indeed, because many BITs were created precisely because investors were skeptical whether state procedures
would protect their assets, the inquiry is likely to be substantially less deferential to the state.
Furthermore, the measure of damages in TRIPS is not well defined
(which is why subsequent instruments have specified criteria); in investment disputes, compensation is set at the “fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place.”101
The damages awarded are therefore likely to be much higher. In WTO
cases, states must conform their laws to the decision of the DSB, face retaliation, or where it is impractical to conform the law immediately, to pay
compensation for future harm.102 In investment arbitration, a state is responsible to pay for losses incurred by investors during the time when it
pursued an action in the WTO. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 477 (Lexis Nexis, 2d ed. 2008).
95.
DSU, supra note 29, at art. 4.
96.
See Permanent Mission Report, Argentina-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals
and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, WT/DS171, WT/DS196 (May 31, 2002),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds171_e.htm.
97.
TRIPS Agreement art. 41.1-41.2.
98.
See text at note 50
99.
TRIPS Agreement art. 47.
100.
See, e.g., KORUS, supra note 54, arts. 11.5, 11.6(1)(d).
101.
See, e.g., id. art. 11.6(2)(b).
102.
DSU, supra note 29, arts. 3.7, 22.
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was in violation of the agreement. For example, when the United States
failed to conform to the 1999 US-110(5) decision, it paid the EU, pursuant
to further WTO arbitration, $3.3 million to cover a three-year period ending in 2004 (the panel had determined the damages to be 1,219,900 euros).103 In an investment dispute Eli Lilly brought against Canada over its
patent rights, it demanded CDN $500 million.104 That difference could
have a considerable impact on the willingness of countries to draft laws
that test the limits of international flexibilities.
Admittedly, the more recent investment treaties exempt “compulsory
licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights” that are in accordance with IP obligations between the parties, which can include
TRIPS obligations.105 But even here, there could be differences in outcomes. The investment obligation may be part of an agreement that limits
flexibilities more than does TRIPS. For example, unlike TRIPS, KORUS
does not permit the exclusion of plants from patentability. Accordingly, a
failure to patent plants could be brought as an investor dispute, but not as
a TRIPS dispute. Similarly, because AUSFTA limits the grounds on which
compulsory licenses can be awarded, it creates grounds for an investment
dispute that could not be asserted in the DSB.
More subtly, inconsistency with international obligations must ultimately be proved by the complainant in a TRIPS dispute.106 In investment
arbitration, consistency with TRIPS is essentially a defense. Accordingly,
it must be proved by the respondent state. Furthermore, since investors
claim their expectations are formed at the time the investment is made,
there is a question whether a country can later alter its IP laws in a way
103.

Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTAhttps://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/dispute-settlement-proceedings/united-states%E2%80%94-section-1105-us-copyright-ac (last visited July 8, 2015); see also Award of the
Arbitrators, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, Recourse To Arbitration
Under Article 25 of the DSU, WT/DS160/ARB25/1, (Nov 9, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/160arb_25_1_e.pdf.
104.
Notice of Arbitration ¶ 85, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Can., (Can. Sept. 12, 2013),
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/dispdiff/eli.aspx?lang=eng. See also Philip Morris Brands and Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 2, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1531.pdf. Philip Morris has brought an action against Uruguay over its trademark rights. The company, which makes double Uruguay’s GDP, is
claiming “substantial” damages – variously said to be in the $25 million-2 billion range. See
Mac Mar Margolis, Uruguay Battles Big Tobacco Over Cigarette Restrictions, NEWSWEEK
(Dec. 9, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/uruguay-battles-big-tobacco-over-cigarette-restrictions-68943; Philip Morris Is Suing Uruguay for Anti-Tobacco Laws, SUMOFUS,
http://action.sumofus.org/a/uruguay-philip-morris/?sub=tw (last visited July 8, 2015); Claudio
Paulillo, Part III: Uruguay vs. Philip Morris, THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 15, 2010,
1:26 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/11/15/4036/part-iii-uruguay-vs-philip-morris;
Philip Morris Sues Uruguay Cigarette-Labeling Claiming Violation of Investment Treaty,
MERCOPRESS (Mar. 19, 2012, 11:23 PM), http://en.mercopress.com/2012/03/19/philip-morrissues-uruguay-cigarette-labeling-claiming-violation-of-investment-treaty.
105.
AUSFTA, supra note 75, art. 11.7(5); KORUS, supra note 54, 11.6(5).
106.
Some aspects of defenses must be proved by the respondent.
TIVE,

Summer 2015]

Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property

575

that affects that investment, even if the alteration is TRIPS-compatible.107
Finally, FTAs can be interpreted as requiring the parties to bring their
laws into closer harmony (in fact, AUSFTA specifically provides that
“each party shall endeavor to reduce differences in law and practice between their respective systems.”).108 As a result, arbitrators may measure
one country’s law by whether it conforms to the others’.109 Given the
rights-centric focus of these instruments, two countries could largely agree
on the appropriate balance between public and proprietary interests, but if
each implemented that view differently, public-regarding provisions in
both systems could be stripped out through successive challenges.110
III.

APPLICATION

Aspects of commodification and assetization are arguably moves in
the right direction. Countries sign on to investment treaties because creating a good investment environment attracts often much needed foreign
capital. Strong IP rights can encourage technology transfer. 111 Well-functioning worldwide rights can also facilitate global licensing and correct fortrade imbalances and job losses caused by the relocation of manufacturing
facilities for knowledge-intensive products. Furthermore, strong rights can
promote widespread access to information and thus enhance appreciation
of foreign culture. The sophistication necessary to appreciate IP may even
preserve the peace. As Thomas Friedman famously observed, “no two
countries that both have a McDonald’s[®] have ever fought a war against
each other.”112 In a world beset by problems such as climate change, pollution, malnutrition, and pandemics, it is imperative to create the conditions necessary to produce knowledge and effectively disseminate the
fruits of creativity. The question, however, is whether the proliferation of
IP, trade, and investment agreements produces (only) these results.
This section exposes the costs of reconceptualizing IP by comparing
the possible resolution of two disputes, one concerning the working requirement and the other about tobacco packaging. Both the decision to
require local working—that is, requiring the patent holder to exploit the
invention in the country where protection is sought—and the decision to
alter tobacco packaging have protectionist implications (the working re107.
See also Ruse–Khan, supra note 67, at 504-508.
108.
AUSFTA, supra note 75, arts. 17.2(11).
109.
See, e.g., Notice of Arbitration, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Can., (Can. Sept. 12,
2013), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-dom
aines/disp-diff/eli.aspx?lang=eng.
110.
Another way in which countries can strip out public regarding exceptions is
through cooperation among patent offices. PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF
KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2010).
111.
See generally, KEITH MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE
GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Peterson Institute
for International Economics, 2012).
112.
Thomas Friedman, Foreign Affairs Big Mac I, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 1996), http://
www.nytimes.com/1996/12/08/opinion/foreign-affairs-big-mac-i.html.
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quirement favors local producers over foreign ones; tobacco packaging arguably leads consumers to buy generic tobacco products of local origin),
but each move also has important social implications for technology transfer (in the case of the working requirement) and health (tobacco regulation). The difficulty is distinguishing between legitimate goals and purely
protectionist ones.
A.

The Working Requirement

Many early patent statutes had dual objectives. On the one hand, they
awarded patents to encourage invention. On the other, they required inventors who received patents to manufacture (“work”) the invention locally.113 The working (or production) requirement is thus a good example
of how incentive-based systems can balance interests: exclusivity allowed
patentees to earn a supra-competitive return, while the working requirement limited the patentee’s freedom to choose exploitation strategies,
thereby safeguarding local interests in such matters as the adequacy of
supply, price, industrial growth, jobs, and training opportunities.
On the whole, the 1883 Paris Convention permitted states to perpetuate such policies. However, the Convention was much more innovatorcentric. Thus, it constrained members from deeming unworked patents immediately forfeit. And in subsequent iterations, it formulated successively
more restrictive compromises between states that imposed a working requirement and those that wished to leave decisions on production and supply to the patent holder.114 Nevertheless, at the time TRIPS came into
force, the Paris Convention continued to permit countries to prevent
“abuse”—including failure to work. Compulsory licenses could be
awarded in the event of nonworking, but not until four years after the
patent application was filed, or three years from the date of the grant
(whichever is last). A patentee must, however, be provided an opportunity
to justify its inaction. Forfeiture is still permitted, but only if, after two
years, compulsory licensing proves insufficient to prevent abuse.115 On an
113.
See generally, Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory Licenses at International Law, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243
(1997); Thomas Cottier et al., Use It or Lose It? Assessing the Compatibility of the Paris
Convention & TRIPS with Respect to Local Working Requirements, (NCCR Trade Regulation: Swiss National Center of Competence in Research, Working Paper No 2012/11 Appendix, June 2013), http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nccr-trade.ch/wp3/Use_it_or_Lose
_it_June_2013.pdf (listing countries with contemporary working requirements). In England,
“Letters Patents,” from which the modern patent is derived, have been granted since the 14th
century. Such Letters Patent gave the inventor or importer the sole right to use it for a period
of time. In exchange for which the realm gained the technology. The Venetian Patent Law of
1474, which is generally considered the world’s first patent act, was clearly grounded on similar principles. It conferred exclusive manufacturing rights to “every person who shall build
any new and ingenious device in this City,” UFF ANDERFELT, INTERNATIONAL PATENT LEGISLATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9 (1971). In awarding patents to inventions built—
rather than invented—in Venice, the Act promoted local industry as well as technology
transfer.
114.
Dinwoodie et al., supra note 94, at 436-443.
115.
Paris Convention, supra note 4, art. 5.
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incentive theory, it is not hard to see why this would be so: the countries
attracted to working requirements are likely too poor to provide significant returns to innovators, compulsory licenses would not undermine potential gains from innovation.116
Commodification would appear to alter this compromise, for both the
trade rationale of TRIPS and its explicit provisions are fundamentally at
odds with the notion that states can demand local working. The WTO
framework is built on a theory of comparative advantage and is intended
to “reduce distortions and impediments to international trade.”117 As
Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Acting Director of the Intellectual Property and
Competition Policy Division at WIPO put it, “because the local working
requirement is inconsistent with the core rationale of the WTO, the
TRIPS Agreement has unequivocally banned it.”118
Textually, the ban is said to derive from two provisions in TRIPS: first,
the bar on discrimination based on “whether products are imported or
locally produced,”119 and second, the provision giving patent holders the
exclusive right to import,120 which is thought to imply that whatever local
interests a state might have in the supply of patentable goods, they can be
satisfied through importation.121 To be sure, the working requirement
under Paris is enforced though the issuance of compulsory licensing, and
since TRIPS includes a provision allowing states to issue compulsory licenses, this exception for “use without authorization” might be thought to
carry forward the Paris compromise on working.122 But nowhere in the
provision is working mentioned. One might therefore conclude that the
general exceptions provision could be used to defend the working requirement’s discrimination by place of production. 123 It is, however, questionable whether a measure that is incompatible with the specific provision on
116.
Cf. Jean O. Lanjouw, A New Global Patent Regime for Diseases: U.S. and International Legal Issues, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 90 (2002) (noting that developing countries
make only marginal contributions to the worldwide profit of pharmaceutical companies);
Alan O. Skyes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3
CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 48 (2002) (suggesting that if developing countries do not contribute to
research costs, “relaxing” intellectual property protection would not be a problem).
117.

TRIPS Agreement Preamble.

118.
NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME
(Kluwer Law International 2010).
119.

TRIPS Agreement art. 27.1.

120.

Id. art. 28.1.

OF

PATENT RIGHTS § 27.66

121.
See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANAL497 (4th ed. 2012) (“The TRIPS Agreement is much more precise than previous international standards in the field. Article 5A(4) of the Paris Convention only deals with
compulsory license for failure to work. In this respect, it must be noted that under art.
28.1(a), importation is sufficient to meet local working requirement.”); see also Eric Bond &
Kamal Saggi, Compulsory Licensing, Price Controls, and Access to Patented Foreign Products, 109 J. DEV. ECON. 217 (2014); Shamned Basheer & Tamir Amin, Taming of the Flu:
Working Through the Tamiflu Patents in India, 11 J. INTELL. PROP’Y RIGHTS, 113 (2006).
YSIS

122.

TRIPS Agreement art. 31.

123.

See id. art. 30.
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compulsory licensing could be defended on the basis of a more general
exception. Besides, the Canada-Pharmaceutical panel decided that a general exception must be nondiscriminatory; if that is correct, the exceptions
provision cannot be applied to excuse discrimination. And even if the exceptions test could be relied upon to defend a local production requirement, the three-part test was, as we saw, interpreted very rigidly and with
little regard for third party interests.124 An exception that covers all the
patentee’s rights and conflicts unreasonably with the exploitation opportunities WTO members intended to provide would, arguably, not survive.
But this conclusion is not without doubt. After all, the TRIPS Agreement explicitly incorporates the Paris Convention.125 The Paris Convention’s used failure to work as an example of “abuse,”126 and that term was
picked up in the TRIPS provision permitting states to combat anti-competitive practices.127 Subsequent to Canada-Pharmaceuticals, the Doha
Declaration emphasized the importance of the Principles and Objectives
provisions of the Agreement128 in interpreting the TRIPS obligations.
These provisions also mention “abuse” that “adversely affects the international transfer of technology.”129 Moreover, they emphasize the goal of
promoting technological transfer in a manner “conducive to social and economic welfare,”130 as well as the protection of public health, if consistent
with the Agreement.131
Thus, most commentators do not entirely agree with de Carvalho, but
instead take the position that TRIPS, at most, limits the working requirement. Daniel Gervais would find a working requirement compatible with
TRIPS when it is used to deal with national emergencies.132 Countries
could, for example, license a local producer in order to secure a low-cost
supply of essential medicines (or to induce pharmaceutical companies to
124.

Id. art. 30.

125.

Id. art. 2.1.

126.

Paris, supra note 4, art. 5A(2).

127.

TRIPS Agreement art. 40.2.

128.
World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreements and Public
Health of 20 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, art. 5(a) (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration] (“In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each
provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the
Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.”).
129.

TRIPS Agreement art. 8.2.

130.

Id. art. 7.

131.
Id. art. 8.1; see also id. Preamble; S.K. Verma, The Doha Declaration and Access to
Medicines by Countries Without Manufacturing Capacity, Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property Under WTO Rules: Intellectual Property, in INTELL. PROP. IN THE
WTO, VOL. 1 623, 636 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010).
132.
Gervais, supra note 121, at 233 (“Forcing a patent to work the invention with a
specific time-frame or exercising a wide-ranging right to issue non-voluntary licenses (in the
absence of an emergency or other similar situation) . . . tip[s] the balance towards the ‘public
interest’ or the interests of actual or potential competitors.”).
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lower their prices).133 Thomas Cottier and his coauthors take a broader
approach: “Since the economic impact and welfare effects of requiring local working will vary depending on a State’s level of economic development and the patented technology in question, such exceptions are
warranted below a certain threshold, which is malleable to the principle of
graduation.”134 For instance, where absorptive capacity is too low for the
transmission of technical knowledge through publications, these authors
would argue that working is acceptable as a way to train a work force and
bring the country to the technological frontier.135
The issue of the relationship between TRIPS and Paris’s working requirement came to the fore in the late 1990s, when Brazil invoked its
working requirement in order to lower the price of AIDS medications.136
The United States requested consultations in the DSB, claiming that Brazil had violated TRIPS’s nondiscrimination provision.137 Possibly because
of pressure from international institutions interested in the health implications of high-priced medicines, the United States eventually agreed with
Brazil to a solution that ended the dispute without resolving the question
definitively.138
With assetization, doubt—and leeway—may disappear. As AUSFTA
demonstrates, the IP chapters of many FTAs do not repeat the Principles
and Objectives that shed meaning on the scope of the TRIPS Agreement.
Nor do they refer to the Doha Declaration.139 The texts of some FTAs are
even more inhospitable to the working requirement than is TRIPS. For
example, AUSFTA permits compulsory licensing only in the case of anti133.
Id. at 497 (“The TRIPS Agreement is much more precise than previous international standards in the field. Article 5A(4) of the Paris Convention only deals with compulsory license for failure to work. In this respect, it must be noted that under art. 28.1(a),
importation is sufficient to meet the local working requirement.”). See also J.H. Reichman,
The TRIPS Component of the GATT’s Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 171, 206 (1993); Hanns Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and
Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS Perspective, (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper Law
No. 2004/3, 2005), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0hz9g1d5;jsessionid=#page-1.
134.

Cottier et al., supra note 113, at 4-5.

135.
See id. at 10; see also Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, Treaty Interpretation in WTO
Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 275 (2010) (arguing that the provision in the Paris Convention
regulating working requirements survives TRIPS).
136.
Ellen F.M. ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential
Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond 44-46 (June 25, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://
cdrwww.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/tHoen.pdf.
137.
See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent
Protection, WTO Doc. WT/DS/199/4 (July 19, 2001).
138.

‘t Hoen, supra note 136, at 45-46.

139.
KORUS mentions the Doha Declaration. See KORUS, supra note 54, art. 18.11.
Thus, it may permit local production to deal with essential medicines, but does not refer more
generally to economic welfare.

580

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 36:557

competitive conduct, national emergency, or for government noncommercial use.140 Nonworking would not appear to qualify.
Working requirements are even more unlikely to survive under the
investment chapters in FTAs and BITs. The main goal of these instruments is to protect investors, which suggests that once a right holder invests in IP with the expectation of relying on particular strategies of
exploitation, disrupting its manufacturing and distribution plans is problematic. Textually, investment chapters in FTAs exempt compulsory licenses, but only when they are consistent with the IP provisions in the
same instrument. Thus, in AUSFTA, a working requirement is potentially
an expropriation of an IP investment asset. Also, dispute resolution would
be handled differently. An investor challenging a working requirement is
less likely to be deterred by geopolitical considerations. For example, a
representative of Merck left little doubt that he considered Brazil’s working requirement an expropriation.141 Furthermore, because the question
whether working requirements survive TRIPS is a close one, any shift in
the burden of proof on TRIPS compatibility from the complainant to the
respondent could be dispositive of the resolution of the dispute.142 Quite
apart from how such a dispute would be resolved, the possibility of extremely high damages could have a chilling effect on countries that might
otherwise consider using working requirements.
In sum, the power to use working requirements to deal with economic
problems becomes more severely constrained as the framing shifts from
the incentive-based rationale of Paris, to commodification through TRIPS,
and then, to the assetization effectuated by investment treaties. The bottom line is that, instead of promoting technology transfer (as TRIPS states
is one of its principles), international law may inhibit it. As the next section shows, commodification and assetization can also limit state authority
to deal with health concerns.
B.

Tobacco Packaging

Issues over the size and scope of health warnings on tobacco packaging and the prohibition of use of logo, pictorial, and figurative marks have
raised questions about the nature of trademark rights and the ability of
countries to regulate for public health where it interferes with the ability
of trademark owners to use their marks as they see fit.
140.
AUSFTA, supra note 75, art. 17.9(7).
141.
See Ruse–Khan, supra note 67, at 497. Merck could not, however, bring such a
challenge because the United States does not have a BIT with Brazil.
142.
To be sure, investment treaties often have public health exceptions to what
amounts to indirect expropriation. For example, AUSFTA provides that: “Except in rare
circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied
to achieve legitimate public welfare objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety,
and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations” AUSFTA, supra note 75,
Annex 11B art. 4(b). However, its applicability to the working requirement is questionable
because the investment chapter specifies that in the event of inconsistency, the other chapter
prevails. Id. art 11.2(1).
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Now that smoking is understood as a health issue,143 countries have
regulated sales and packaging of tobacco in a variety of ways. Limits on
advertising via radio, television, printed matter, restrictions on retail outlets, and existing health warnings on packets (while varying in scope and
detail among jurisdictions) have not in the view of the World Health Organization (WHO) been enough to address public health concerns.144
Guidelines to the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC)145 therefore recommend that plain packaging be used to further
reduce tobacco consumption. 146 In 2011, Australia’s plain packaging legislation prohibited the trademark holder’s use of any logo or figurative
marks on the packaging.147 The law also places limits on the use of word
marks, requiring them to be standard font and size.148
If the core role of trademarks is to exclude competitors in order to
prevent confusion, then as long as Australia permits the use of one trademark to identify the product, consumers can distinguish among goods. Or
to put it another way, the trademark holder retains the incentive to develop strong word marks because the right to prevent others from using
the marks endures. But commodification makes Australia’s case much
harder. Indeed, the compatibility of the legislation with the TRIPS Agreement has provoked five WTO members to lodge complaints that were consolidated to be heard by the same panel.149 In May 2015, one of the
143.
See e.g., Regina Benjamin, Preface to U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., How
Tobacco Smoke Causes Disease: The Behavioral Basis for Smoking Attributable Disease, A
Report of the Surgeon General, at iii (2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK53017/
pdf/TOC.pdf (enumerating the harmful chemicals inhaled by smokers).
144.
World Health Org., Confronting the Tobacco Epidemic in a New Era of Trade and
Investment Liberalization, at 37 (2012), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2012/978924150
3723_eng.pdf (commissioned by the World Health Org. Tobacco Free Initiative).
145.
World Health Org. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003,
2302 U.N.T.S 166 (entered into force Feb. 27, 2005).
146.
World Health Org. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Conference of
the Parties, Durban, South Africa, Nov. 17-22, 2008, Elaboration of Guidelines for Implementation of Article 11 of the Convention, ¶ 46, FCTC/COP3(10) (Aug. 21, 2008) (“Parties should
consider adopting measures to restrict or prohibit the use of logos, colours, brand images or
promotional information on packaging other than brand names and product names displayed
in a standard colour and font style (plain packaging). This may increase the noticeability and
effectiveness of health warnings and messages, prevent the package from detracting attention
from these, and address industry package design techniques that may suggest that some products are less harmful than others.”).
147.
Australia also adds its own health warnings. See, e.g., Abby Phillip, Australia Put
Cigarettes in Standardized Packs with Graphic Labels—and They’re Working, WASHINGTON
POST (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2014/11/12/
australia-put-graphic-labels-on-cigarette-packs-and-theyre-working/.
148.
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) s. 21; Tobacco Plain Packaging Regulations 2011 (Cth) reg. 2.4.1.
149.
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Ukraine, Australia—Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS434/11 (Aug. 17, 2012) (panel composed May 5,
2014); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Honduras, Australia—Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
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complainants requested the proceedings be suspended.150 The other complainants may well keep the dispute going, and many regard it as a close
case.151 While the Paris Convention retained the incentive-based system, it
provided a platform for commodification by recognizing, among other
things, that the trademark owner controls licensing and assignments.152
TRIPS took the process much further, giving a nod to the trademark
owner’s interest in making affirmative use of the mark (and not merely in
excluding others). Thus, the Agreement provides that “the use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably encumbered by special requirements,”153 and it acknowledges that trademark can be acquired
through use.154 Furthermore, it allows for domestic exceptions only by
way of an analogue to the three-step test.155 These many references to
“use,” coupled with the overall context and object and purpose of trademark protection and the TRIPS Agreement,156 lead commentators to suggest that a country seeking to encumber use of the mark must show why
doing so is not unjustified.157
At the same time, the core provision of TRIPS (the “Rights Conferred”) describes only the “exclusive right to prevent all third parties,”
suggesting that trademark owners only have the right to prevent infringing
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS435/16 (Oct. 17, 2012)
(panel composed May 5, 2014); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the Dominican
Republic, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications
and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging,
WTO Doc. WT/DS441/15 (Nov. 14, 2012) (panel composed May 5, 2014); Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by Cuba, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS458/15 (Apr. 14, 2014) (panel composed May 5,
2014); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Indonesia, Australia—Certain Measures
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS467/15 (Mar. 6, 2014)
(panel composed May 5, 2014). There are other agreements that Australia is arguably also
violating, in particular the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
150.
Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (last
updated June 22, 2015), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds434_e.htm
(stating that Ukraine requested the panel to suspend its proceedings in accordance with Article 12.12 of the DSU, on May 28, 2015).
151.
See, e.g., Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and Interpretation of the
TRIPS Agreement, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1149 (2013).
152.
Paris Convention, supra note 4, art. 6quater. Paris also facilitated entry into new
markets through the protection for well-known marks and the requirement that every country that is a party to the Convention register marks in the same form (telle quelle) as they are
registered in the country of origin. Paris Convention, supra note 4, arts. 6bis. & 6quinquies
A(1).
153.

TRIPS Agreement art. 20.

154.

Id. arts. 15.3, 19.

155.

Id. art. 17.

156.
157.

See Frankel & Gervais, supra note 151, at 1197.
See id. at 1185, 1187-1190, 1198-1202.
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uses158 (in contrast, some national laws refer to the owner’s right “to use
the trade mark”159). While trademark holders may have an interest in how
their marks are perceived, under this view, states still retain considerable
authority to regulate for public purposes.
Arguably, however, assetization removes some of the flexibility that
even commodification retains.160 The IP chapters of FTAs strengthen the
hand of trademark owners. For example, KORUS and AUSFTA betray a
concern that labeling requirements not impair the effectiveness of the
trademark.161 They also protect trademark holders from cyber piracy.162
AUSFTA goes further, referencing the ability of trademark owners to “assert rights.”163 The TPP is similar: it requires adoption of several trademark treaties,164 requires recognition of the importance of the Joint
Recommendation on Well Known Marks,165 and mandates protection for
trademark holders in cyberspace.166 Investment chapters in these agreements and the BITs build on this foundation. As we saw earlier, investment protection is not necessarily tied to the question whether a trader
enjoys an unambiguous channel of communication with customers.
Rather, it focuses on protecting investment-backed expectations.
The difference assetization makes may soon become evident, for Australia’s plain packaging is being challenged not only by several states in the
WTO; it is also the subject of an investment dispute filed by Philip Morris
Limited Asia (PML) based on a BIT between Australia and Hong Kong
that provides that: “Investors . . . shall not be deprived of their investments
nor subjected to measures having effect equivalent to such deprivation . . .
except under due process of law, for a public purpose related to the internal needs of that Party, on a non-discriminatory basis, and against compensation.”167 The BIT also provides that: “Investments . . . shall at all
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection [and parties shall not] in any way impair by unreasonable or discrimi158.
TRIPS Agreement art. 16.1. See Tania Voon & Andrew D. Mitchell, Face Off:
Assessing WTO Challenges to Australia’s Scheme for Plain Tobacco Packaging, 22 PUB. L.
REV. 218, 234-36 (2011). See also the discussion in Frankel & Gervais, supra note 151, at
1184-1186.
159.

See, e.g., Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 20 (1)(a) (Austl.).

160.
By this we do not mean to suggest that Australia will lose the investment claim
brought against it. This claim involves other issues that we do not discuss here.
161.
KORUS, supra note 54, art. 18.2(3); AUSFTA, supra note 75, art. 17.2(3). Both
provisions address use of a common name in connection with the trademark.
162.

KORUS, supra note 54, art. 18.3(1); AUSFTA, supra note 75, art. 17.3(1).

163.

AUSFTA, supra note 75, art. 17.2(12)(a).

164.

TPP 2015, supra note 11, art. QQ.A.8(2).

165.

Id. art. QQ.C.5(3).

166.

Id. art. QQ.C.12.

167.
Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong
Kong for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-H.K., art. 6, Sept. 15, 1993,
1748 U.N.T.S. 385.
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natory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or
disposal of investments . . . .”168
PML’s notice of arbitration demonstrates the potential effect of reconceptualizing IP as an asset. PML asserts that Australia’s plain packaging
legislation “manifestly deprives PML of the IP and the commercial utility
of its Brands” 169 and “transform[s] PML from a manufacturer of branded
products to a manufacturer of commoditized products with the consequential effect of substantially diminishing PM Asia’s investments in Australia,”170 leading to a loss “potentially amount[ing] to billions of dollars.”
171 PML, in short, assumes that, as its brand is centrally important to its
business, it has a right to use its trademark at its discretion.
Of course, an assumption does not win the case, but the core issues
before the investment Tribunal may well be different from those which are
the WTO disputes’ focus. Thus, it is possible that a substantive analysis of
whether trademark holders have any interests beyond the right to exclude,
which is contentious under Paris and TRIPS, will not even arise in the
investment dispute.172 Furthermore, issues both regimes apparently have
in common could easily be decided differently. Both disputes require a
finding of an adverse effect (“encumbrance,” “expropriation,” or “inequitable treatment”), but because the instruments will presumably be interpreted in accordance with their object and purpose, and the objects and
purposes of these instruments are different, the two tribunals could easily
disagree on whether there is an effect and whether it is actionable. Australia may even be whipsawed, because a finding at the WTO that plain packaging is an encumbrance (even if not “unjustified”) could be used as
supporting PML’s claim that Australia has deprived it of its asset.173 Ultimately, it is possible that both disputes will turn on whether a sufficient
showing can be made that the regulation contributes to overall reduction
of smoking or actually stops smoking,174 an issue which will be very diffi168.

Id. art. 2(2).

169.
Notice of Arbitration, Australia/Hong King Investment Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Austl.), UNCITRAL PCA
Case. No. 2012-12, (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0665.pdf.
170.

Id. ¶ 1.5; see also id. ¶¶ 1.6, 44.

171.

Id. ¶ 11.

172.
The DSU would not necessarily have to determine this point by deciding the dispute on the basis of TRIPS art. 20, but it remains an open question for the WTO. See TRIPS
Agreement.
173.
Australia’s constitutional case also considered the legislation (Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011) an impairment. The High Court of Australia found that there had been no
expropriation contrary to the guarantee provided by s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution. This was because the government had not taken title to the trademarks at issue. However, both the majority and the dissent found that the trademarks had been impaired. JT Int’l
SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 ¶¶ 102-41 (Austl.); see id. ¶¶ 210-13.
174.
See Frankel and Gervais, supra note 151, at 1177. As to who has the burden of
proof, see id. at 1206-11.
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cult to resolve, particularly within the time-frame of the disputes.175 And
each tribunal might handle the question differently: they may rely on different evidence and impose different rules concerning the size and the
placement of the burden of proof. Thus, even if Australia were to win in
the WTO, an adverse decision under the BIT could lead it (or other countries that have agreed to investor-state arbitration) to become less willing
to experiment with IP flexibilities.
IV. ADDRESSING

THE

EFFECTS

OF

RECONCEPTUALIZATION

Because IP is traditionally associated with incentive-based rationales,
it is doubtful that countries entering into FTAs, BITs, and plurilateral
agreements fully understood that instead of merely heightening the level
of protection to accommodate the increasing importance of knowledge
production, they were fundamentally altering the scope of intellectual
property and the analysis of what is considered actionable, or realized how
deeply the instruments might undermine national capacity to strike the
appropriate balance between proprietary and public interests. Paris and
Berne clearly left the job of balancing to states, and while TRIPS constrained their flexibility, it did not explicitly eliminate it. Yet our analysis
of the working requirement post-TRIPS shows that states may no longer
be able to facilitate their citizens’ acquisition of technical proficiency. In a
knowledge economy, countries that are unable to move up the value chain
have little choice but to rely for comparative advantage on cheap labor (if
that). Left in a technological backwater, they are doomed to remain net
importers of IP.
The analysis of Australia’s tobacco legislation is equally problematic.
Science is not static, and neither can be its interface with the legal system.
As new technologies develop and as the impact of old technologies are
better understood, countries must have some freedom to adapt both IP
legislation and impacted regulatory regimes. In this section, we discuss
how global governance of IP could be improved to revitalize the quantitative analysis associated with incentive-based systems and show how it is
possible to restore balance into the system.

175.
Compare Christian Kerr, Labor’s Plain Packaging Fails as Cigarette Sales Rise,
THE AUSTRALIAN (June 6, 2014), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/labors-plain-packaging-fails-as-cigarette-sales-rise/story-fn59nokw-1226945123085# (suggesting
that packaging legislation is not reducing smoking in Australia), with David Currow, Why
Plain Packaging Is Reducing the Number of Smokers in Australia, THE SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (June 25, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/comment/why-plain-packaging-is-reducingthe-number-of-smokers-in-australia-20140624-zsjt9.html#ixzz3C2uMMFc9 (stating that
“since the introduction of plain packaging in 2012, there has been solid, peer-reviewed and
transparent evidence of its effectiveness” and citing several studies in support), and Jidong
Huang et al., Cigarette Graphic Warning Labels and Smoking Prevalence in Canada: A Critical Examination and Reformulation of the FDA Regulatory Impact Analysis, 23 TOB. CONTROL i7 (2014) (suggesting that graphic warnings have reduced smoking in Canada).
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Norm Shifting

When Larry Helfer discussed regime shifting, he optimistically suggested that when IP is relevant to a regime, that regime would develop
norms that reflect its own object and purpose. He concluded that these
regimes would not remain isolated, but rather global positions would develop through experimentation, cross-pollination, counter-norm development, and ultimately integration.176 Because the agreements he discussed
addressed distributive justice and other public concerns, had his prediction
come to fruition, the IP system as a whole would have retained the power
to balance interests and deal effectively with any new problems presented
by technological change and scientific advancement. But as we have seen,
what has happened instead is an increase in the level of IP protection and
a concomitant restriction on flexibilities. Conceptualizing IP as an asset
led to the idea of “if value, then right” (if creativity has produced value,
then there is an ownership interest in it), which leaves little room for countervailing considerations.177
The reason Helfer’s vision did not come to fruition is, at least in part,
that norm development has been asymmetric. Increasing IP protection has
mainly occurred through the adoption of binding instruments, such as the
WCT, the WPPT, FTAs, BITs, and plurilateral agreements, several of
which have their own dispute resolution mechanisms (there are some exceptions, such as the Joint Recommendation on Well Known Marks, but
where these provide additional protections, they have become incorporated into hard law instruments).178 The standards articulated are therefore directly actionable norms and, because they are repeated in
successive bilateral and plurilateral agreements, they are highly likely to
be implemented in multiple state laws. In this way, they not only have
effect within their own regime, but they also feed back into the TRIPS
Agreement and WTO dispute resolution. Thus, when the DSB looks at
state practice to interpret TRIPS provisions, as it did in CanadaPharmaceuticals, it will be looking at a widespread practice as brought
about at least in part by these instruments. And because the WTO, with its
multinational membership and dispute resolution system, remains a pri-

176.

Helfer, supra note 6, at 71-78.

177.
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in
the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 400-12 (1990); cf., Rasmus Neilsen,
Superflex Keynote Speech: If Value, Then Copy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735, 736 (2014) (“If
Value, Then Copy, is a brilliant parody of the property rights syllogism described by Rochelle
Dreyfuss.”).
178.
See Joint Recommendation, supra note 81. See generally WILLIAM R. CORNISH,
GENEVIAN BOOTSTRAPS, [1997] EIPR 336. Similarly, these norms could enter the WTO regime through TRIPS art. 71.2, which permits amendments “merely serving the purpose of
adjusting to higher levels of protection” without further negotiation when the provisions appear in other multilateral instruments accepted by other members of the WTO. See TRIPS
Agreement art. X(6).
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mary institution of IP development, a decision based on these norms then
becomes a guide for every member of the WTO.179
Furthermore, some norms are in multilateral instruments negotiated
under the auspices of WIPO (the WCT and WPPT are examples). While
WIPO currently describes its mission as “the development of a balanced
and effective international intellectual property (IP) system that enables
innovation and creativity for the benefit of all,”180 the Convention establishing it describes its objective as “promot[ing] the protection of intellectual property throughout the world.”181 The result is that the norms it
develops also tend to weigh on the side of right holders. And because
Paris, Berne, and WIPO’s cooperation with the WTO are built into
TRIPS,182 WIPO norms also impact WTO dispute resolution fairly directly. For example, the US-110(5) panel consulted WIPO about the
norms found in the WCT on the copyright owner’s rights of communication to the public and its relationship to the copyright three-step test.183
In contrast, norms developed around measures, such as those that
Helfer considered, tend to be soft law and thus rarely find a home in instruments that bind all relevant actors. As such, they usually have no direct corollary in state law. Nor do they usually have the imprimatur of
WIPO. Accordingly they can never raise a true clash of norms within dispute resolution. When the rubber hits the road, they are not easily integrated into the IP landscape. The FCTC is an example. It seems unlikely
that the WHO guidelines on plain packaging of cigarettes would be
treated as a norm countervailing the asserted rights of trademark holders.184 And even the few instruments that are public-regarding or are de179.
For example, once the Canada-Pharmaceutical panel approved Canada’s procedure for regulatory review, Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 36, §§ 7.42, 7.78, similar provisions were adopted in Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore.
180.
Inside WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/aboutwipo/en/ (last visited July 8, 2015).
181.
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 3.1,
July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
182.
TRIPS Agreement arts. 1.3, 9.1, 68 & Preamble; Agreement Between the World
Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, Preamble, Dec. 22,
1995, 35 I.L.M. 754 (1996).
183.
US-110(5), supra note 36, ¶ 6.69. See also Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8,
162-165; Graeme Dinwoodie & Rochelle Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual Property
System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 46 HOUSTON L. REV. 1187
(2010). See also Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty
on TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 441, 451-55 (1997) (arguing for continual
incorporation of WIPO copyright norms).
184.
The DSB when deciding if a US law, which was aimed at protecting sea turtles,
complied with the GATT Agreement considered whether turtles were an “exhaustible natural resource” by reference to several environmental agreements (including the CBD). See
Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab
.htm. The Appellate Body did not weigh the environmental norms against GATT norms, but
used the environmental norms to establish whether a sea turtle fell within the meaning of
“exhaustible natural resources.” Interestingly, the WTO states on its website that it “wishes
to underscore” that it did not decide that the US could not regulate to protect the environ-
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veloped by WIPO, like the Treaty for the Visually Impaired, are so
restrictive in their rules that they too have very limited effect.
But the impact of asymmetry need not be assetization. TRIPS includes
an important counterweight to the reconceptualization problem and to the
WTO’s powerful ability to instantiate global norms. While the Basic Principles of the TRIPS Agreement permit states to implement more extensive
protection, there is a proviso: they may not go so far as to “contravene the
provisions of the Agreement.”185 Now that it is clear how easily theories
of commodification and assetization can unravel the rationale behind IP
protections, the proviso could play a more prominent role in the future.
The Objectives provision of TRIPS recognizes that IP protection should
be to the mutual advantage of producers and users, create a balance of
rights and obligations, and promote technical transfer.186 Thus, agreements that undermine those objectives should not be regarded as legitimately made.187 The proviso would also require countries negotiating new
agreements and WTO decision makers to engage in the sort of quantitative analysis that is characteristic of incentive-based systems. Under this
approach, for example, it would be difficult to argue that the prevalence of
FTA norms that bar a working requirement support the view that TRIPS
overruled the Paris compromise. Such a prohibition would destroy the balance contemplated by the objectives and purposes of TRIPS.188
Other steps could be taken to make the quantitative approach more
salient to the trade and investment community. For example, some observers would create a counterweight by urging states to adopt explicit user
rights.189 Others would insert user rights into international instruments.190
ment, and noted that in fact the US would not require WTO permission to do so. See United
States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis08_e.htm (last visited July 8, 2015). The U.S.
lost the dispute because it did not comply with aspects of the GATT. See also infra discussion
at notes 215-216.
185.
TRIPS Agreement art.1.1. Article 1.1 was expressly relied upon in the China-Enforcement case, albeit for a different proposition. See China-Enforcement, supra note 50, ¶
7.513.
186.

TRIPS Agreement art. 7.

187.

See Frankel, supra note 8.

188.
Article 1.1 is not a substantive right. TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1. Thus, a rejection
of FTAs as a TRIPS norm would permit countries to agree between themselves not to use
working requirements where this fits the stage of development and so from the viewpoint of
those countries was to the mutual advantage of producers and users. See Ruse–Khan, supra
note 67, at 511–12.
189.
See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 22–30 (2004); David Vaver, Copyright and the Internet: From Owner
Rights and User Duties to User Rights and Owner Duties?, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 747
(2007); DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW 171 (2000) (“User rights are not just loopholes.”);
Niva Elkin-Koren, Affordances of Freedom: Theorizing the Rights of Users in the Digital Era,
6 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD., 96, 109 (2012).
190.
See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law System: New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 213, 219
(2004).
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More directly, there are those who argue that existing exceptions and limitations should be considered user rights.191 With any of these approaches,
public interests would then be treated on an equal footing with owners’
rights. Arbitrators would no longer be inclined to interpret proprietary
rights broadly while construing user interests narrowly. In dispute resolution of all types, decision-makers would be balancing concerns of genuinely equivalent weight. They might thus be compelled to ask the
questions that lie at the heart of incentive-based systems, such as how
much incentive is needed to inspire creativity, and whether the challenged
measure interferes substantially with that incentive.
B.

Interpretation

In addition to identifying counter-norms to the strong IP rights propounded by binding instruments, there are approaches to interpretation
that can offer important avenues for anchoring commodification and investment protection measures to the incentive-based rationales of domestic law, Berne, and Paris. That is, interpretation can operate as the
mechanism by which other values found in both IP and non-IP instruments, including the Basic Principles of TRIPS and guidelines promulgated by organizations such as WHO, are taken into account when dispute
settlement analyses compliance with obligations.
1.

BITS and Investment Chapters of FTAs

As discussed earlier, the investment chapters in FTAs and BITs define
IP as an asset. It is reasonable to assume that in doing so, the nations who
were parties to the agreements intended these instruments to mean something qualitatively different from TRIPS. It is, however, questionable
whether they meant to go as far as IP holders, who have the right to bring
challenges under these instruments assert. Because investor rights and IP
rights are both private rights, IP holders tend to equate the investment
protectable under these instruments to the private economic value of their
IP rights. Further, they see IP rights as reliance interests that are defined
by the law at the time they made their investment or, more extremely,
when the agreement references TRIPS or its own IP chapter, the law at
the time when the investment agreement was made.
This investor view does not, however, logically follow from the move
to assimilate IP into investment agreements. Not all IP-related investments have the quality of investment assets for purposes of investor-state
dispute settlement. A NAFTA dispute between the United States and
Apotex provides insight into the issue.192 Apotex, a Canadian generic
drug manufacturer, intended to make its goods in Canada and sell them in
191.
See P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, OPEN SOC’Y INST., CONCEIVING
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT 11–25
(2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017629.
192.
Apotex Inc. v. U.S., Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (N. Am. Free Trade
Agreement Tr. 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1550
.pdf [hereinafter Apotex].
AN
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the United States; to do so it applied to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for premarket clearance. When it was stymied by a statutory provision that prevented it from suing to have the patents on the
products it wished to make declared invalid,193 it brought an investment
dispute against the United States claiming an expropriation of its “property right” in the application for market clearance. A NAFTA Tribunal
rejected the claim on jurisdictional grounds, finding that the expense incurred in the regulatory FDA approval process was not an “investment”
and Apotex was not an “investor.”194 According to the Tribunal, “a company’s activities undertaken in its capacity as a foreign exporter of goods
into the territory of a NAFTA Party are not addressed by [the investment
chapter of NAFTA].” 195
For IP, this suggests that the expenses entailed in the act of registration are not protectable on their own. 196 Each situation will depend on its
facts; where there is investment in addition to registration, the result may
be different.197 The Apotex tribunal drew a distinction between exporters
and investors suggesting that investment provisions are intended to protect actual investments in the relevant contracting party. What amounts to
an investment may be a fine line, but mere expenditures on registration
appear insufficient. Additionally, in all domestic systems, registration can
be challenged. If a challenge to registration succeeds, arguably, there was
nothing to be expropriated. In the NAFTA investment dispute against the
Government of Canada, for example, the complainant pharmaceutical
company disputes the invalidation of patents in the Canadian Court system.198 Canada’s defense includes the assertion that a judicial finding of
invalidity means there is no investment within the meaning of NAFTA.199
193.
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
194.

Apotex, supra note 192, ¶¶ 103(c), 158, 243.

195.

Id. ¶ 143.

196.
Different considerations may apply to copyright both because copyright is not a
registered right and also because copyright works may be imported and exported more readily online than many patented goods (software is an obvious exception).
197.
Admittedly, an argument can be made that there is a difference between obtaining
marketing approval and registering a trademark. The FDA approval is incidental to the IP;
registration is central. This was a difference noted in Canada-Pharmaceuticals, albeit for a
different purpose. Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 36. However, when registration is
merely a prelude to importation, the investment would be analogous to the FDA expenses
rejected by the NAFTA Tribunal.
198.
Notice of Arbitration ¶¶ 72, 77, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No.
UNCT/14/2, (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/eli.aspx?lang=eng.
199.
An important aspect of Canada’s defense is that the patent office rules note this
point and the statute reflects the distinct role of the courts. Canada also notes that the complainant has had due process before the Canadian courts. Statement of Defence Part V, Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Statement of Defence, Part V,
(June 30, 2014), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/eli-statement-declaration.aspx?lang=eng.
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The working requirement provides a further illustration. If a country takes
the position that a working requirement cannot be fulfilled by importation
because it did not involve local production, the existence of the patent
may not be enough to subject the country to arbitration under the BIT.
The incentives and balancing rationales underlying IP protection can
be helpful in determining how much more than mere registration is required. Relying in particular on the Basic Principles of TRIPS, which use
concepts like “the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge,”200 would better align investment treaties with the core IP
agreements. In the example of the working requirement, a protectable investment might include technology transfer, local research and development activities, or building manufacturing facilities, all of which would
help the country develop an innovative sector of its own.
From an interpretive perspective that incorporates IP values, it is
equally flawed to determine the value of an investment by considering the
law on the date the investment was made or the date the investment
agreement went into force. IP rights are intended to promote innovation.
But innovation can be both dynamic and disruptive. Countries may argue
about whether it is the province of the courts or the legislature or the IP
agencies to respond to new scientific developments, but no country with
developed IP law operates as if the law is static. Each innovation, be it
gene sequencing, oil-consuming bacteria, oncomice, or cloud computing,
requires reinterpretation of the relevant statutes, if not reweighing of public and private interests.201 Since innovators should know that the legal
rules may change while they are engaged in research, during the registration process, or even later, it is difficult to see how a law (whenever
adopted) that meets the standards required by international IP obligations
can amount to an expropriation.202 Indeed, international obligations are
framed as minimum standard regimes and include flexibilities, such as undefined terms, in order to permit continual recalibration.
Even when a measure is considered an expropriation, there are opportunities to tether the analysis to the incentive based rationale of IP. Here,
the focus would be on what it means for an expropriation to be permissible because it is for a public purpose. For example, the tobacco dispute
will undoubtedly raise the question whether the alleged expropriation is
justified on the grounds of public health. Unlike some BITs which carve
200.

TRIPS Agreement art.7.

201.
See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013); , D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. [2015] HCA 35; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 307 (1980); Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45
(Can.); ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2498 (2014). An analogy to the WTO Appellate
Body decision is Shrimp Turtle. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) http://www
.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm. There the Appellate Body noted that “natural resources” is
not static but is by definition evolutionary. Id. ¶ 130.
202.
The same is true for users: they have no reliance interests in the continued existence of particular exceptions. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012).
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out public health purposes from the definition of expropriation,203 the
Australia-Hong Kong BIT does not, creating the possibility that public
purpose includes only the exercise of police powers.204 However, if linked
to IP, which in the plain packaging dispute it is, then interpreting public
purpose more readily includes the promotion of public health.
Tania Voon and Andrew Mitchell suggest the decision on permissibility may also depend on proportionality between the public purpose and
the interference with the trademark holder’s interest. 205 In this case and
in contrast to norm creation discussed above, a soft law such as the FCTC
may support Australia’s interpretation.206 A similar analysis applies to the
working requirement: tying the analysis of public purpose to IP’s traditional rationales makes it evident that there is a public purpose in requiring the patent holder to provide training opportunities and technology to
the local community so that it can build domestic innovation capacity.
To be sure, a finding that an expropriation is permissible to effectuate
a public purpose would require the respondent to pay damages. Once
again, IP law may be helpful in this evaluation as most countries, consistent with TRIPS, have compulsory licensing or government use provisions
that require compensation. Cases under these laws offer a framework with
which to determine the appropriate level of the award.207 Under an incentive-based rationale, these could be calculated to be sufficient to induce
investment in innovation (since that is all intellectual property rights
promise) and to deter infringement, rather than to return to the right
holder every penny of profit that could be earned in the jurisdiction.208
Interpreted in these ways, it is clear that investment treaties need not
be viewed as going a step further from TRIPS up the assetization line. In
both cases, rights protection is leavened by an interest in social welfare
and is not detached from public regarding issues. Attention to incentives
provides a way to determine the appropriate balance.
2.

TRIPS, Plurilateral IP Agreements, and IP Chapters of FTAs

As we saw, many FTAs exempt actions related to IP from expropriation if they are compliant with TRIPS. For these FTAs, the interpretation
203.
See AUSFTA, supra note 75, art. 17.9(7).
204.
See, e.g., Tania Voon & Andrew D. Mitchell, Implications of Investment Law for
Plain Tobacco Packaging: Lessons from the Hong Kong-Australia BIT, in PUBLIC HEALTH
AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES 137, 157 (Tania Voon et al. eds. Edward Elgar, 2012).
205.
Id. at 158.
206.
See generally Tsai-yu Ln, The Status of FCTC in the Interpretation of Compensable
Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Adopt ‘Stricter’ Tobacco Control Measures Under
BITs, 9 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 123 (2014).
207.
See generally JAMES PACKARD LOVE, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, RECENT EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSES ON PATENTS (2007), http://www.keionline
.org/misc-docs/recent_cls_8mar07.pdf.
208.
Cf. Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 517 (2014) (suggesting that remedies be calculated based on public-regarding factors).

Summer 2015]

Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property

593

of TRIPS is critical to creating a balance between public interest and private IP rights. Admittedly, Canada-Pharmaceuticals together with US110(5) put the position of public regarding principles in second place to
rights-holders concerns, but a use of interpretative principles209 to include
the incentive basis of IP protection would directly connect protection to
the balancing factors that are found in the Basic Principles. For example,
the three-step tests use many terms with normative implications: they direct adjudicators to consider whether the challenged measure is “limited”
(patents, trademarks, and designs) or “special” (copyright); whether the
measure “unreasonably” conflicts (patents, designs) with “normal” exploitation (patents, copyrights, design); whether it “unreasonably”
prejudices the “legitimate” interests of the right holder (patents, copyrights, trademark, designs), taking account of the “legitimate interests of
third parties” (patents, trademark, designs). Neither of the panels was willing to construct normative frames with which to consider the import of
these terms.210 However, with a better understanding of the rationale for
protection, the adjudicators could have grounded their analysis in a consideration of whether the challenged measure undermined incentives to
innovate and the extent to which the diversion of gain was intended to
create a balance among producers, users, and later generations of
innovators.
To some extent, later WTO developments followed this route. Thus,
the Doha Declaration sought to address the problem of valorizing economic interests over public interest concerns described in the Basics Principles. It underscored the relevance of object and purpose of IP to TRIPS
interpretation, a principle found in the Vienna Convention,211 by declaring that interpretation takes into account the Basic Principles that allow
countries to balance rights and obligations.212 Panel decisions subsequent
to Doha likewise appear more conscious of countervailing public interests.
Perhaps this was because later disputes were about provisions that were
more flexible than those considered earlier; while the provisions that
Doha was concerned with were not the focus of the EC-GI and ChinaEnforcement panel reports. Nevertheless, in both reports, the DSU took a
more progressive view of the legitimacy of state regulation. And we might
expect that the Appellate Body will take a similar approach. Robert
Howse has suggested, as a standing tribunal, it is likely to be more cognizant of public values than are the ad hoc panels that have resolved most of
209.
These principles include context and object and purpose. See Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27,
1980).
210.
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO
Panel Decision and the “Three Step Test” for Copyright Exemptions, 187 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3, 17 (2001) (noting that the US-110(5) panel failed to use the
consideration of “normal” exploitation in the three-step test for copyright to develop norms
on what copyright holders have the power to exploit).
211.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 31.

212.

TRIPS Agreement.
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the earlier IP disputes.213 Similarly such a body could be expected to take
account of the rationales underlying IP protection.
Other sources may also be used to interpret TRIPS. To be sure, the
DSU does not permit panels or the Appellate Body to fill gaps. Rather it
must interpret the existing agreements.214 Put differently, interpretation is
not the place for norm development, nor would the WTO allow an external agreement to trump its own. However, the WTO has shown itself willing to consider all relevant norms in an interpretative framework. For
example, in the Shrimp-Turtle report, the Appellate Body considered what
the term “exhaustible natural resource” meant in non-WTO environmental agreements. 215 Depending on the part of TRIPS at issue in any given
dispute, the interpretation process may follow this example. As we have
seen WIPO agreements (both past and future) are a key source for construing IP-specific terminology. Non-IP instruments external to the WTO
can be used for interpretive purposes through a Shrimp-Turtle-like process. Public health provides an example. The WTO is unlikely to treat the
FCTC as creating a clash of norms with the TRIPS Agreement.216 It may,
however, consider it relevant to interpreting the meaning of “public
health” found in the Basic Principles. In the tobacco dispute, this means
that the FCTC could be used to interpret whether the packaging encumbrances are not unjustified.217 From an incentive perspective, this could be
framed as an assessment of whether packaging regulation is an intrusion
on trademark owners’ incentives.
These approaches to TRIPS interpretation could also be used when
considering the IP chapters of plurilateral agreements and FTAs. Of
course, countries are largely free to eliminate flexibilities among themselves. Thus, a working requirement could be barred by an FTA or a pluri213.
Robert Howse & Makau Matua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy:
Challenges for the World Trade Organization, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT YEARBOOK 1999/2000: THE MILLENNIUM EDITION (Hugo Stokke & Anne Tostensen, eds., 2001);
see also Robert Howse & Efraim Chalamish, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in InvestorState Arbitration: A Reply to Jürgen Kurtz, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1087, 1094 (2010).
214.
DSU Article 3(2) provides: “The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The
Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations
and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the
covered agreements.”
215.
The landmark dispute for allowing the use of non-WTO sources to interpret WTO
obligations. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm. See also Susy Frankel, WTO Application of “the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law” to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 424
(2006).
216.
World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21,
2003, 2302 U.N.T.S 166 (entered into force Feb. 27, 2005).
217.

Frankel and Gervais, supra note 151, at 1206.
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lateral IP agreement (and might have been by the US-AUSFTA FTA).218
However, the extent to which trading partners intended to eliminate flexibilities will often require interpretation. For example, WHO guidelines on
medical care might be helpful in determining whether Korea had met its
KORUS obligations on pricing pharmaceuticals,219 especially if supplemented with an analysis of whether the prices set maintained sufficient
incentive to innovate.
In this context, it is even clearer that the proviso in the TRIPS Agreement that states not contravene the Agreement could be used to set an
affirmative limit on the scope of deviations, 220 for, in some cases, greater
protection could intrude upon the balance third-party countries have set.
For example, an agreement to protect marks against dilution will affect the
marks that can be adopted in every one of the FTA parties’ trading partners; an agreement to protect second uses of known materials affects every
country that might have imported the known compound from one of the
parties. Similarly, requirements to seize goods in transit can conflict with
the ability of countries to rely on parallel importation to meet their
needs.221 While these third countries could probably not bring an action
for violation only of the Basic Principles,222 these Principles might be the
basis for challenging such FTA measures in a non-violation complaint on
the theory that they impede the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement, including the incentive based rationales of IP. 223 There is currently a moratorium on non-violation complaints under the TRIPS Agreement,224 but
once the moratorium ends, such challenges may go far in helping to restore the quantitative dimension of IP.225

218.

See AUSFTA, supra note 75.

219.
See KORUS, supra note 54; see, e.g., Medicines Price Information, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/access/ecofin/en/ (last visited July 8,
2015).
220.

TRIPS Agreement art 1.1.

221.
The national and most-favored-nation provisions could also reduce flexibilities in
third nations, raising the same issue. Id. arts. 3, 4.
222.
Of course, they could claim other violations and use the Principles in support of
their argument. For example, India and Brazil have brought actions against the EU and the
Netherlands to challenge in-transit seizure, European Union and a Member State-Seizure of
Generic Drugs in Transit, DS 408 & DS 409 (request for consultation received 11 and 12 May
2010).
223.

GATT, supra note 10, art. XXIII(1)(b).

224.
TRIPS Agreement art. 64.2. There have been successive postponements; the latest
is until February 2015. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 for Least Developed Country Members,
Decision of the Council for TRIPS, IP/C/64 (June 11, 2013); see also, Responding to Least
Developed Countries’ Special Needs in Intellectual Property, WORLD TRADE ORG. (last updated Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ldc_e.htm.
225.
See Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of
Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1023, (2009).
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Going Forward

The governance of IP described in these pages is not ideal. The multiplicity of international lawmaking is re-conceptualizing IP first as a commodity, then as an asset, and in the process it has crowded out room for
quantitative analysis that vindicates public-regarding interests. Strong
countries created binding agreements appropriate to their advanced state
of development, but the norms were then imposed on countries for which
the provisions are not appropriate. Right holders have a choice of institutions in which to press their demands and a choice of forums in which to
assert them. Each time one of these institutions recognize flexibility in
TRIPS, powerful nations shift to another regime and dismantle it. In the
blur of negotiations, the conceptual foundations of IP have been lost without anyone fully considering the impact of reconceptualization on the
landscape as a whole. The prior discussion proposed two methods to
reconnect IP (even as it is conceived of as a commodity or an asset) firmly
to its foundations as an incentive-based system: counter-norm development and interpretation. But now that the dynamics of IP reconceptualization are understood, it should be possible to better govern the evolution of
international IP law going forward.
As the effect of TRIPS on the working provision in the Paris Convention shows, one reason for the emerging disconnect with IP incentives is
that the relationships among many of these instruments are often unclear.
Much has been written about relying on maxims such as lex specialis and
temporal relationships among agreements in interpretation generally.226
However, these rules have proved extremely unsatisfactory at identifying
substantive outcomes in IP cases.227 Negotiators (and the institutions in
which they operate) can do better. As Kate Miles has pointed out, because
investment negotiators come from a culture steeped in the private law of
commercial transactions, they can lack appreciation for the public interests
at stake.228 They could also easily misunderstand the rationale underlying
the recognition of IP rights. Much the same can be said for those negotiating trade agreements—to them, the instruments are about market access
and IP is simply one more commodity.
226.
See, e.g., Henning Grosse Ruse–Khan, The International Law Relation Between
TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding TRIPS
Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325 (2011); see also Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the
Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, UN
Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
227.
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 158-168. See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
¶ 152, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000) (refusing to consider the relationship between
Berne and TRIPS).
228.
Kate Miles, Reconceptualising International Investment Law: Bringing the Public
Interest into Private Business, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY 295, 296 (Meredith Kolsky Lewis & Susy Frankel eds. Cambridge University Press
2010).
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Over time, as more agreements involving IP are negotiated and negotiators are forced to learn about IP and the impact of their regimes on IP,
this problem may abate. Thus, the most recent FTAs do consider relationships when they arise internally. For example, the investment chapter of
KORUS provides that “[i]n the event of any inconsistency between this
Chapter and another Chapter, the other Chapter shall prevail to the extent
of the inconsistency.”229 Some also refer explicitly to TRIPS and to other
IP agreements. 230 And WIPO, which has considerable experience in the
IP field, details the relationships among its instruments and with
TRIPS.231 But unfortunately, these connections are often superficial. The
references merely name the treaties, they do not attempt to reconcile differences in object and purpose, even when they overlap significantly in
coverage.232
Moreover, the references in FTAs to TRIPS make it clear that TRIPS
obligations are incorporated; the status of public-regarding provisions, particularly those found in the TRIPS Basic Principles, are not clearly made a
part of the FTAs. Were those relationships better specified, there would be
less of a tendency to see these agreements as a one-sided approach to assetizing IP. If the instruments made the appropriate linkages and clarified
the relationships among agreements, they would point specialist adjudicators towards the rationales underlying protection. As a result, dispute resolution would be more consistent across agreements and could provide
more effective guidance.
Significantly, some agreements include highly targeted carve-outs or
very specific obligations. For example, the TPP apparently permits parties
to exempt tobacco control measures from the scope of investor-state dispute resolution.233 On the other side, KORUS has a provision mandating
that “interested parties” have an opportunity to be heard on price controls
over pharmaceuticals.234 Acknowledging the need for these specifics provides another opportunity to take a sounder approach to lawmaking, for
negotiators could consider whether the urge to specify or carve out betokens a more general problem.
For example, the carve-out the TPP may be considering to permit
Australia to administer a “nudge” to smokers could be broadened to permit states to use similar measures to influence people to change their
229.

KORUS, supra note 54, art. 11.2(1).

230.

Id. art 18.1(2).

231.
See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 1(1), Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No.
105-17 (specifying its relationship to Berne); Treaty for the Visually Impaired, supra note 52,
art. 11 (noting the relationships among the three step tests in Berne, TRIPS, and the WCT).
232.
The US-110(5) case is an example, where a key issue was how Berne and TRIPS
interrelate.
233.
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Summary of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (October 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/
press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership.
234.

KORUS, supra note 54, art. 18.8(6).
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health-related behavior more generally.235 The tobacco carve-out could
then be used as an example within the broader exemption. Such an approach would provide guidance to regime members as they adopt domestic law—if illustrated with enough examples, it would not only alert
members to what is possible, it would also provide assurance that states
will not take the permissiveness further than the parties intended. Similarly, illustrating permissible price structures for pharmaceuticals, geared
to the level of return necessary to induce innovation, would provide better
assurance of internationally fair prices than giving pharmaceutical companies an opportunity to be heard in individual domestic price setting
discussions.
Including illustrations would also provide significant assistance in dispute resolution. For example, one reason the EC-GI dispute was resolved
more permissively than the Canada-Pharmaceuticals case or the US-110(5)
case was that the trademark exceptions test included a specific example (a
carve-out for fair use of descriptive terms) to guide the analysis.
To help negotiators appreciate the relevance of IP values and countervailing norms, more than their experience in negotiating successive agreements may be required. The real problem appears to be isolation, or as
Miles puts it, a failure of cultural transformation.236 To expand the resources available to negotiators, observers (including WIPO) have issued
reports on limitations, exceptions and public interest considerations.237
Others have suggested setting ceilings on how far any regime—hard or
soft—could raise the level of protection.238 Another possibility is to develop intellectual property’s acquis: a set of background rules drawn from
existing instruments and national laws that articulate the “multisourced
equivalent norms” inherent in IP.239 The acquis would clarify for negotiators the limited nature of IP protection, illuminate its roots in the objective
of creating incentives, and clarify that the ultimate purpose is the advancement knowledge for the public welfare, and not to generate private gain.
235.
See, e.g., Alberto Alemanno, Nudging Smokers – the Behavioural Turn of Tobacco
Risk Regulation, 3 EUROPEAN J. RISK REG’N 1 (2012).
236.

Miles, supra note 228, at 314-15.

237.
See, e.g., WIPO Standing Committee on Patents, Experts’ Study on Exclusions
from Patentable Subject Matter and Exceptions and Limitations to the Rights, SCP/15/
3.(2010) (prepared by Lionel Bently, et al.); Ruth L. Okediji, The International Copyright
System: Limitations and Public Interest Considerations for Developing Countries (2006) (prepared under the auspices of the UNCTAD - ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development); BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT (2008), www.ivir.nl/publicaties/hugenholtz/finalreport2008.pdf.
238.
Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse–Khan, Enough Is Enough—The Notion of
Binding Ceiling in International Intellectual Property Protection, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP., COMPETITION & TAX LAW, 41-44, 64-67 (2008), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1326429.
239.
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 175-201; Tomer Broude, Principles of Normative Integration and the Allocation of International Authority: The WTO, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the Rio Declaration, 6 LOY. L. REV. 173 (2009).
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The acquis would also help states identify the flexibilities available to them
to advance local objectives and offer adjudicators and arbitrators a better
perspective on the interests at stake in dispute resolution.
Adopting the transparency, access, and participation principles suggested by Benedict Kingsbury and Richard Stewart as part of their Global
Administrative Law initiative is also imperative. Not only would procedural protections improve the legitimacy of international lawmaking, they
would also promote cross-fertilization among investment, trade, and IP regimes.240 The TPP (and before it ACTA) was negotiated in secret and the
drafts of the agreement are confidential.241 As a result, it is near impossible for counter-norms to be considered unless negotiators introduce them.
Were nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) given an opportunity for
direct and significant participation, negotiators would be in a better position to consider such questions as the level of protection actually needed
and whether there is an appropriate balance with public interest concerns.
Because the same NGOs tend to appear each time their interests are the
subject of negotiation (and have formed strong networks that likewise follow multiple negotiations), they could also help identify latent linkages
among international regimes.242
Procedural values are also critical for dispute resolution. More transparency, receptivity to amicus briefing, consultation with other international organization (along the lines of the relationship between the WTO
and WIPO), and references to the decisions of other tribunals would provide decision makers with a broader context in which to consider disputed
issues.243 With regard to the WTO, a review of the DSU began in 2000,
and many of these proposals are being actively debated.244 In addition,
consideration has been given to professionalizing the panel stage of dispute resolution by replacing ad hoc panelists with a permanent body.
Among other things, this would reduce the temptation of panelists to decide cases in a manner that will lead to their reappointment.245
240.
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 15-61 (2005). See also Michelle Limenta,
Open Trade Negotiations as Opposed to Secret Trade Negotiations: From Transparency to
Public Participation, 2012 NZ YEARBOOK OF INT’L LAW.
241.
See also Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property
Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. (2014) (noting that greater openness
at the domestic level would give negotiators a better appreciation for the interest within their
own country).
242.
See, e.g., Miles, supra note 228, at 315-18; Margaret Chon, Global Intellectual Property Governance (Under Construction), 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 349 (2011) (discussing
the work of norm entrepreneurs); Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization
and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 177 YALE L.J. 804, 821, 824 (2008).
243.
See generally Donald McRae, What Is the Future of WTO Dispute Settlement, 7 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 3 (2004) (comparing the procedures of domestic courts with the DSU).
244.
Bernard Hoekman, Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and Assessment, The
World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 5525 1, 15 (2011), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/
doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5525.
245.
Cf. Miles, supra note 228, at 309 (discussing the same point in relation to investorstate arbitration).
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Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroides have put forward another
proposal: they would provide special prosecutors to developing countries.246 Such prosecutors, if supplemented by defense attorneys, would be
particularly helpful for IP, because their availability could correct the current imbalance between developed and undeveloped countries in dispute
resolution. Because most of the disputes are among the developed countries that can afford to be involved in these cases, the range of flexibilities
considered are limited to those necessary to win. Broader flexibilities, including those dealing with the unique interests of developing countries are
rarely brought to the attention of adjudicators (interestingly, however, developing countries are the main complainants in the Australia tobacco
case). As a result, there is a paucity of WTO law on what sorts of flexibilities are permissible. For example, there is no definitive conclusion about
the working requirement, even though a dispute was lodged in 2001. How
many countries have contemplated using local working but were deterred
by the lack of international guidance is unknown. 247
The growth of investor-state dispute resolution has shined a spotlight
on the structure of that system. As we noted in the Introduction, several
countries have begun to balk at joining investment agreements;248 others
are withdrawing.249 Their concerns are clear. The powers of private parties
in these disputes, the high damage awards, and the potential disconnect
between the interests of the state and its investors (including for IP, the
interests of states in utilizing flexibilities) have led participants to realize
that these arrangements can backfire. Nonetheless, there is value in them.
Creating IP and manufacturing products in which IP is embedded can be
an expensive proposition, and when the investment is in foreign countries,
it requires protection. While it may make more sense for IP to improve the
enforcement provisions of TRIPS, we do not take the position that investor-state dispute resolution should be rejected wholesale.250 Retaining
membership in BITs will, however, require a series of changes. Most are
246.
Bernard M. Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance, 23 WORLD ECONOMY 527, 536 (1999).
247.
See generally Hunter Nottage, Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, GEG Working Paper 2007/47 (2009), http://www.globaleconomicgovernance
.org/geg-wp-200947-developing-countries-wto-dispute-settlement-system (noting that participation by developing countries in other aspects of WTO dispute resolution can make the
WTO more responsive to their concerns).
248.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text. See also Ann Capling & Kim Richard
Nossal, Blowback: Investor–State Dispute Mechanisms, in International Trade Agreements, 19
GOVERNANCE 151 (2006) (discussing the reasons why AUSFTA, unlike NAFTA, does not
provide for investor-state dispute resolution).
249.
See, e.g., ICSID and Latin America: Criticisms, withdrawals and regional alternatives, BILATERALS.ORG (June 25, 2013), http://www.bilaterals.org/?icsid-and-latin-americacriticisms.
250.
To be sure, some regard the problems we see in investment arbitration as an advantage. See Peter B. Rutledge, TRIPS and BITS: An Essay on Compulsory Licenses, Expropriation, and International Arbitration, 13 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON. 149 (2012).
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beyond the scope of this paper.251 We focus on the problem relevant to IP:
the lack of systemic engagement with public-regarding interests in the investment context caused by the obliteration of the incentive basis for IP
protection. Accordingly, like Kate Miles, we would support the creation of
a central appellate body for investment disputes to address both consistency and substantive issues, on the theory that it would have the same
appreciation for IP rationales as Howse suggests the Appellate Body
would have for public-regarding principles. Further, it would endure for
long enough to develop a better grasp of IP rationales.252 As with our
approach to the WTO, we would also adopt measures to expand the vision
of arbitrators, including through the participation of third party countries.
CONCLUSION
This paper has traced the reconceptualization of IP and the concomitant solidification of the IP landscape. Through the examples of the working requirement and tobacco packaging, we have demonstrated how the
progression from Paris and Berne, to TRIPS, and to FTAs and BITs has
detached IP from its foundations. These agreements, although nominally
designed to facilitate technology transfer and promote investment in technological progress, can have the opposite effect and constrain the ability of
states to deal with local economic concerns and public health.
We do not dispute the theory of comparative advantage or the notion
that investors require protection against expropriation and arbitrary treatment. However, the fact that each regime has distinct objectives and purposes leads to obfuscation of the qualitative nature of IP as an incentivesdriven system. While some see the solution in even more regime shifting,
experience shows that public-regarding norms tend to be created in soft
law instruments whereas higher levels of protection are generally encoded
into binding law and are often accompanied by compliance systems.
To restore a place for balance, international lawmakers and adjudicators must focus on the nature and purpose of that which is being protected.
IP lawmakers need to be cognizant of other regimes and public-regarding
concerns. In their analysis of issues and interpretation of agreements, decision makers should ensure they remain alert to IP values and refrain from
contributing to the reconceptualization of the IP regime in ways that lead
to longer-term isolation of public regarding interests. As states consider
their position in international negotiations, they too must recalibrate. Positions in the technology hierarchy change over time, and every state must
recognize that the flexibilities it now wishes to limit may become indispensable to its society’s future wellbeing. Even those in the strong position
now may not have considered where this reconceptualization puts them in
the future, when they are not necessarily at the forefront of innovation or
251.
U.N. UNCTAD, Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITS: Impact of Investor-State Claims, 2 IIA 1, 8 (2010), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf.
252.
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because they are not in control of the IP intensive part of an innovationrelated value chain. In either situation, those pushing assetization now
may wish for more flexibility in the future.

